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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 
I. FEDERAL ABSTENTION IN LAND USE CASES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In two recent cases, I the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that district courts had acted within their discretion in abstaining 
from the exercise of federal question jurisdiction in two inverse 
condemnation suits. In each case a California city had declared 
8 moratorium on development in an area that included plan tiffs 
property, and plaintiff complained that the property was "taken" 
in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United 
States Constitution. In Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 2 plaintiffs 
alleged that the city had included a road over which they claimed 
an easement in the open space element of the city's general plan 
and had imposed unreasonable conditions upon the right to pave 
that road. In Sante Fe Land Development Company v. City of 
Chula Vista 3 plaintiff alleged that the city had down zoned an 
area containing plaintiffs industrial property to include commer-
cial, residential, and open space elements. Both complaints al-
leged that the cities had converted private property into public 
lands without paying just compensation.4 In each case the district 
court abstained from exercising jurisdiction. However, in 
Sederquist the federal action was stayed while in Sante Fe the 
action was dismissed. Relying heavily on the three-pronged ab-
stention test announced in Canton v. Spokane School District 
#8P the Court of Appeals concluded that the courts had not 
1. Sante Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 596 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 
Mar., 1979) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were. Curtis, D.J. and Goodwin, 
J.); and Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 590 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. Sept., 1978) (per Wallace, 
J.; the other panel members were Smith, D.J. and Hug, J.). 
2.Id. 
3. 596 F.2d 838. 
4. While the Sederquists predicated their complaint solely on the federal Constitu· 
tion, the Sante Fe Land Improvement Co. based its complaint on both federal and state 
constitutional proscriptions against uncompensated"takings." 
5. 498 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1974). In Canton, the Ninth Circuit applied and catalogued 
the abstention requirements announced in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 
(1941). See note 12 supra. Pullman abstention should be ordered only where: 
(1) The complaint "touches a sensitive area of social policy 
upon which the federal government ought not to enter unless 
no alternative to its adjudication is open." 
(2) "Such constitutional adjudication plainly can be avoided 
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abused th~ir discretion by refusing to exercise jurisdiction. 
The court held that the lower court erred in dismissing the 
action in Santa Fe and that the action should have been stayed. 
B. BACKGROUND: THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINES 
If a case is properly within a federal court's jurisdiction, that 
court generally has an affirmative duty to exercise its jurisdiction 
without discretion to decline.' Normally, the court may not refuse 
to hear a case arbitrarily,? merely because another forum is avail-
able to plaintiff,8 or because a case involves state issues that are 
difficuW or for which there is no precedent. lo 
However, there are certain contravening interests and princi-
ples that form the bases for narrow exceptions to a court's duty 
to decide a case properly before it. 1I The most firmly established 
exception is generally referred to as the "Pullman doctrine."12 In 
(3) The possibly determinative issue of state law is doubtful. 
Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 590 F.2d at 281, citing Canton v. Spokane School Dist. #81, 
498 F.2d at 845; Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 596 F.2d at 839-
40. 
6. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 403 (1821). 
7. United States v. Hofsteen Tse-Kesi, 191 F.2d 518, 520 (lOth Cir. 1951). 
8. Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510 (1972). 
9. Williams v. Green Bay and W. R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 556-57 (1946); Meredith v. 
City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1943), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 738 (1943), 
mandate conformed to 141 F.2d 348 (1944), rehearing denied, 141 F.2d 1019 (1944). But 
see County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 187 (1959) and Louisiana 
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27·28 (1959). For a discussion of 
abstention in cases involving difficult state law issues, see note 22 infra. 
10. E.g., Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 720, 722 (4th Cir. 1967). 
11. Some of these considerations are: (1) that decisions of constitutional law should 
be avoided where a case can be disposed of on the basis of state law, Ashwander v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936); (2) that conflicts between the state and 
federal systems should be avoided wherever possible, Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 
312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941); (3) that where a case involves state law that is unsettled or 
possibly violative of the federal Constitution, it should be reserved to the state courts 
wherever posssible, Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 87-88 (1975); 
American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 409 U.S. 467, 468 (1973); 
Spector Motor Servo Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944); and (4) that congestion 
of the federal court dockets should be relieved where feasible, Railroad Comm'n v. Pull-
man Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). 
12. Named for the leading case on the subject, Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 
U.S. 496 (1941), where plaintiffs sought to enjoin as invalid an order of a state railroad 
commission requiring Pullman conductors to supervise all sleeper cars on passenger trains. 
Before the order was issued, many sleeper cars were staffed only by porters (most of whom 
were black). Pullman porters joined with the railroad company as plaintiffs, complaining 
that the rule would deprive blacks of their jobs and was violative of the fourteenth amend-
ment as well as state law. The Supreme Court ordered the district court to abstain from 
assuming jurisdiction pending a state court ruling because the state court could invalidate 
2
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this form of abstention, the district court postpones its exercise 
of jurisdiction when a federal constitutional issue may be ren-
dered moot or substantially modified by a state court decision 
involving the same parties and controversy. When a court ab-
stains under Pullman, it retains jurisdiction over any federal is-
sues which may remain after the state ruling. 13 Another exception 
to the court's duty to hear a case over which it has jurisdiction is 
frequently referred to as "Burford abstention."I. This type of ab-
stention is appropriate when a suit involves issues that are of 
the order and thus render the constitutional issue moot. The Court based its decision 
largely on a "scrupulous regard for the rightfuf independence of the state governments." 
[d. at 501. 
13. The litigant has the option of submitting all issues, state and federal, to the state 
court for a final adjudication, or of reserving the federal issues for final adjudication in 
the federal court after all state issues have been decided. England v. Louisiana State Bd. 
of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 421 (1964). 
14. Named after Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), a case involving a state 
regulatory commission's grant of permission to drill oil wells in a certain Texas oil field. 
The Supreme Court ruled that a district court had properly dismissed the federal action 
where the state had established a complex regulatory scheme to deal with such cases. 
Because the issues were complex and of particular importance to the state, and because 
previous federal intervention had already resulted in significant friction between the state 
and federal governments, the Court held that the federal courts should allow the state to 
form its own policy in such matters of predominantly local importance. [d. at 331. 
Burford abstention is based on comity, that is, a respect for the fact that the United 
States is comprised of separate state governments whose interests will best be served by 
allowing them to make their own policy decisions. Burford abstention is only justified 
when a case involves issues in which the state has a predominant interest. Santa Fe Land 
Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 596 F.2d at 842. 
The Court greatly expanded Burford in Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern 
Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951). There, the Court ordered abstention in a case which did not 
qualify under Pullman, did not involve a complex state regulatory scheme, nor had a 
history of friction resulting from past federal intervention. Further, the record did not 
reflect that the state provided more complete judicial review than could be had in the 
federal courts, as was the case in Burford. The sole basis for the Alabama decision was 
that the state had a predominant interest in deciding the case because it involved dis-
tinctly local factual issues. One circuit court has taken Alabama to stand for the broad 
proposition that any time a state has an interest in the subject matter of a federal action, 
the federal court should abstain in order to prevent state-federal friction. Kelly Servo Inc. 
V. Johnson, 542 F.2d 31,33 (7th Cir. 1976). Such a broad reading of Burford has no support 
in the Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit opinions, and the authoritativeness of both Kelly 
Services and Alabama should be questioned in view of the rule that abstention should be 
ordered only in extraordinary circumstances. 
In Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. V. United States, 424 U.S. BOO, 813 (1976) 
the Court reiterated the exceptional nature of abstention in a case involving water rights, 
an issue of extreme importance to western states. Even though the state had established 
a complex judicial scheme for deciding questions relating to water rights, the Court dec-
lined to apply Alabama to find abstention proper in that case. It appears that the Colorado 
River Court properly narrowed the application of abstention to truly extraordinary cir-
cumstances, and reaffirmed the general rule that federal courts should exercise jurisdic-
tion in cases properly before them under all but a few greatly limited circumstances. 
3
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predominantly state interest, and federal invervention would in-
terfere with the state's efforts to deal with those complex issues. 
When a court abstains on the basis of Burford, the federal action 
is dismissed rather than stayed. 
C. THE COURTS' ANALYSES 
Pullman Abstention 
In Canton v. Spokane School District #81,15 the Ninth Circuit 
interpreted Pullman as requiring that three conditions be met 
before a court could properly abstain. Applying the Canton anal-
ysis, the Sederquist and Sante Fe panels ruled that the first re-
quirement was met in that plaintiffs' complaints "touche[d] a 
sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal courts ought 
not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is open."t6 
Relying on the 1976 case of Ranchos Palos Verdes Corp. v. City 
of Laguna Beach, t7 in which the court ruled that because Califor-
nia had recently enacted a complex web of statutes dealing with 
land use issues, the state had a contervailing interest in dealing 
with land use issues. For that reason the federal courts should not 
deny the state the opportunity to formulate its own policy. The 
Sederquist court expressed apprehension that federal interven-
tion might impede the state's effort to deal with complex land use 
issues, adding that any conclusion a federal court might reach 
would only amount to a guess at what a state court might decide 
in the future. 18 
15. 498 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1974). In Canton, a typical Pullman abstention case in 
which federal jurisdiction was predicated on a federal question, the Ninth Circuit applied 
and catalogued the abstention requirements announced in Pullman. For the Pullman 
abstention requirements see note 5 supra. 
16. 590 F.2d at 281, quoting Canton v. Spokane School District #81,498 F.2d at 845. 
17. 547 F.2d 1092, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1976). 
18. 590 F.2d at 281-82. The question of whether eminent domain is a type of absten-
tion unto itself has been raised by two highly similar cases which do not otherwise fall 
neatly within any defined abstention doctrine. While County of Allegheny v. Frank Ma-
shuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959) and Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 
360 U.S. 25 (1959) do appear to be related to Burford-type abstention, neither case would 
qualify for abstention under a narrow reading of Burford. 
Both Allegheny and Thibodaux, decided on the same day, involved issues of state 
eminent domain and were brought on diversity jurisdiction. The Supreme Court overruled 
the lower court's dismissal in Allegheny where the applicable state law was held to be 
clear. However, in Thibodaux, a stay was affirmed as the applicable state law was held 
to be unclear. The two heavily divided decisions are difficult to reconcile. The Thibodaux 
opinion emphasized the "special nature" of eminent domain which made it "intimately 
involved with sovereign pre~ogative." 360 U.S. at 28-29. However, in Allegheny the major-
ity ruled that "[slurely eminent domain is no more mystically involved with 'sovereign 
prerogative' " than a host of other concerns of state government which have been decided 
4
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The second prong of the Canton test was satisfied in both 
cases because federal constitutional issues could be avoided by 
applying state lawis which prohibits zoning that amounts to an 
uncompensated taking of private property,20 and which prohibits 
unreasonable conditions upon the right to improve private prop-
erty.21 
by the federal courts. 360 U.S. at 192. While the two cases taken together do show that 
abstention may be appropriate in eminent domain cases, it is impossible to formulate any 
firm rule based solely on these two cases. It may be that abstention is proper where a case 
involves eminent domain issues coupled with unsettled state law, although if a case 
involves only one of these factors a federal court should not relinquish jurisdiction. 
In Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. 800 (1976), Thibodaux was 
interpreted as standing for the proposition that abstention is appropriate in cases where 
unsettled state law is presented, the importance of which outweighs the result of the case 
then at bar. Id. at 814. While both Thibodaux and Pullman require unsettled state law, 
the latter type of abstention is based on the policy of avoiding constitutional issues. It 
remains undecided if eminent domain is the only issue whose importance so overshadows 
the result in a given case that it merits a separate category of abstention. 
19. The court ruled that the fact that the Sederquists had worded their complaint so 
as to raise only federal issues was not a bar to their holding. 590 F.2d at 282. The plaintiffs 
in Ranchos Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547 F.2d 1092, 1095 (1976), also 
drafted their complaint so as to raise only federal issues. In that case, too, the court ruled 
that such a ploy could not prevent a finding that constitutional issues might be avoided 
by applying state law. 
This issue was not pertinent in Sante Fe because plaintiffs raised both federal and 
state issues in their complaint. 
20. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65912 (West Supp. 1978) (codifed CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14, 
which provides that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use 
without just compensation having first been made to ... the owner .... " 
The Sederquist panel relied on Newport Investments, Inc. v. City of Laguna Beach, 
564 F.2d 893, 894 (9th Cir. 1977), in deciding that because the California constitutional 
proscription against uncompensated "takings" was the "mirror image" of that provision 
in U.S. CONST. amend. V, the state court should be afforded the first opportunity to 
interpret the state Constitution as a matter of policy. In Sante Fe, however, the court cited 
Stephens v. Tielsch, 502 F.2d 1360, 1362 (9th Cir. 1974) which held that abstention is not 
justified when state and federal constitutional provisions are such "mirror images." While 
the Sante Fe court declined to overrule Newport Investments, it does appear that 
Stephens is the better rule. The Supreme Court recently held that abstention is not 
justified by such "mirror image" provisions. Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Sur-
veyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 598 (1976); Harris County Comm'rs Court v. 
Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 84 n. 8 (1975). But see Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 478 (1971) 
(distinguished in Stephens v. Tielsch, 502 F.2d at 1361-62). Other circuits have followed 
the Stephens rule. Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002, 1010 (5th Cir. 1978); Connecticut 
State Fed'n of Teachers v. Bd. of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 471, 485 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(dictum). The question of whether Newport Investments or Stephens is the correct rule 
in the Ninth Circuit would not affect the outcome of either of the principle cases because 
a state court could rule on the basis of the statutory provisions, obviating the need for a 
ruling on the constitutional issues. 
21. The Sederquist court held that plaintiffs' allegation that unreasonable conditions 
had been attached to the granting of a permit to pave their access road could be settled 
under CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (Deering Supp. 1979) which permits an individual 
to appeal a decision of an administrative agency directly to a state court. See Mobil Oil 
Corp. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. App. 3d 293, 130 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1976). 
5
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Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that the third prong of the 
Canton test was satisfied because the applicable state law was 
"manifestly unclear."22 In the 1975 case of HFH, Ltd. v. Superior 
Court, 23 the California Supreme Court specifically reserved judg-
ment on the question of entitlement to compensation where a 
zoning regulation forbade substantially all use of private lands. 
The Sederquist court also ruled that whether a city had abused 
its discretion by refusing to issue plaintiffs a permit to pave their 
access road necessarily depended upon state and local law . There-
fore, the court held that it ought not attempt to anticipate a state 
court ruling on this issue. 
In holding that the principle cases met the criteria an-
nounced in Canton, the court found that sufficient counterbalan-
cing interests were present to justify an exception to a court's 
duty to decide 8 case over which it has jurisdiction. However, 
abstention is not justified merely because a case meets the 
Canton criteria. If equitable considerations exist which justify an 
22. Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 690 F.2d at 282; Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. 
v. City of Chula Vista, 696 F.2d at 841. The degree of unclarity required has not been 
firmly established. The most common formulation is that the requirement has been met 
if the state law is "susceptible" to an interpretation that would avoid or substantially 
modify the constitutional challenge. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 628, 634·36 (1966). 
Another standard is whether state law "may fairly be read" so as to avoid the constitu· 
tional issue. Boehning v. Indiana State Employees Ass'n Inc., 423 U.S. 6, 7·8 (1976). One 
commentator has suggested that no real standard exists and that the decision whether 
state law is sufficiently unclear depends upon the "court's view of the substantive issues 
that the case presents." Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 690, 
602·03 (1977). 
At this time, it is unresolved whether abstention is proper in private litigation merely 
for the purpose of avoiding difficult state law where there is no constitutional or predomi. 
nant state issue to be avoided. In Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236 
(1943), the Court ruled that mere difficulty of applicable state law does not justify absten· 
tion. The later cases of Thibodaux and Allegheny, cast some doubt on the authoritativ· 
eness of Meredith. See note 18 supra. However, in McNeese v. Board of Educ. for Com· 
munity School Dist. 187, 337 U.S. 668, 673 n. 6 (1963), the Court again ruled that mere 
difficulty of state law was not a sufficient ground for abstention. Lower federal courts have 
been inconsistent in their application of these cases. For a time, the Fifth Circuit ruled 
abstention proper simply because the state law was unclear. See United Services Life Ins. 
Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483,484·86 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935. However, 
it appears that that holding was predicated largely on the distaste for diversity jurisdic· 
tion. See Bendar, Abstention Under Delaney: A Current Appraisal, 49 TEx. L. REV. 247 
(1971). Recent cases indicate that Delaney is of questionable reliability. Imperial Enter· 
prises, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 1976). The Ninth 
Circuit rejected the Delaney ruling in Tomiyasu v. Golden, 358 F.2d 651, 654 (9th Cir. 
1966). No later case has appeared which alters this rule. 
23. 15 Cal. 3d 608, 518 n. 16, 126 Cal. Rptr. 366, 372 n.16, 542 P.2d 237, 244 n. 16 
(1975). 
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immediate adjudication by the federal court, abstention will not 
be ordered.24 Abstention will necessarily result in a delay in reach-
ing a judgment on the merits. However, the delay involved in 
Sante Fe and Sederquist would be minimal because both plain-
tiffs had already commenced an action in the state court before 
the running of the statute of limitations. 25 While the Sederquist 
court specifically ruled that the burden placed on the plaintiffs 
was small and was outweighed by the interests served by ordering 
abstention, the Sante Fe court did not consider whether addi-
tional equitable considerations justified an immediate adjudica-
tion by the federal court. 
Burford Abstention 
Having de~ided that Pullman abstention was justified, the 
24. The court will not abstain when doing so would result in undue hardship to the 
parties. In Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 229 
(1964), the Court refused to abstain where doing so would have increased the length of 
time required to implement integration of a school system. In Pikev. Bruce Church, Inc., 
397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970) the Court declined to order abstention when the ensuing delay 
would have resulted in the economic loss plaintiffs sought to avoid by bringing suit origi-
nally. 
25. There is some support for a fourth type of abstention which is ordered only for 
the convenience of the court and to avoid duplicative proceedings. In McClellan v. Car-
land, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910), the Supreme Court ruled that the mere pendency of an 
action in state court does not justify federal abstention. The lower federal courts have 
shown dissatisfaction with the McClellan requirement that both state and federal actions 
prol=eed until one of them results in a final judgment that would be res judicata as to the 
other. Most of the circuit courts have held that a district court may abstain when a similar 
action is pending in a state court. Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc., 521 F.2d 817, 
820 (9th Cir. 1975); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 681 (5th 
Cir. 1973); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1949). 
In Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 809 
(1976), the Supreme Court upheld a lower court abstention order where a similar suit was 
pending in state court. However, the Court based its order on a federal statute which the 
Court interpreted as giving support to the proposition that states have a countervailing 
interest in deciding matters pertaining to water rights. Thus, in Colorado River, the Court 
ruled that "the circumstances permitting dismissal (for purposes of judicial economy) are 
substantially more limited than circumstances appropriate for abstention." [d. at 818. 
While the Supreme Court has not ruled abstention appropriate solely for the purpose 
of advancing judicial economy, there is considerable support among the commentators. 
See, Kurland, Toward a Co-Operative Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention 
Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 490-92 (1960); Note, Stays of Federal Proceedings in Deference 
to Concurrently Pending State Court Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 684 (1960); Note, Power 
to Decline the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 37 MINN. L. REV. 46 (1952); Note, Power 
to Stay Federal Proceedings Pending Termination of Concurrent State Litigation, 59 YALE 
L.J. 978 (1950). For a more detailed discussion of the various forms of abstention, see lA, 
Pt. 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, ~ 0.203(2)-(4); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION §§ 4241-46; C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE 
LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 52 (3d ed. 1976). 
7
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Sante Fe court also ruled that Burford dismissal was inappro-
priate on several grounds. In Ranchos Palos Verdes Corp. v. City 
of Laguna Beach,28 the court noted that California has not at-
tempted to relegate land use cases to anyone court or set of 
courts.27 Further, even if California had established a special 
court to hear such cases, the facts of Sante Fe did not indicate 
that federal intervention would interfere with the state's efforts 
to establish its own policy in a matter of predominant state inter-
est. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Sante Fe court 
held that the issues involved were not sufficiently complex or 
unique so as to warrant Burford dismissal. 28 Therefore, the Sante 
Fe panel ruled that the district court had abused its discretion 
in dismissing the case. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In Sederquist and Sante Fe, the Canton interpretation of the 
Pullman doctrine was applied in a typical and straightforward 
manner. As it was in 1976 when Ranchos Palos Verdes was de-
cided, land use planning remains a sensitive area of intense state 
interest.2V For this reason, California continues to have a predomi-
nant interest in establishing its own policies in this area. All 
matters raised by plaintiffs in both cases could be decided under 
state 'law. Finally, at the present time the California Supreme 
Court has still not ruled on entitlement to compensation where a 
zoning law disallows all use of plaintiffs property, and any deci-
sion a federal court might make concerning plaintiffs' complaints 
would amount to a mere forecast of what a state court might rule 
in the future. In fact, the degree of unclarity of state law in these 
cases surpasses any standard that has been applied by the federal 
courts. 
Simply meeting the Canton requirements does not, of itself, 
justify abstention.30 Ordering abstention will always result in a 
delay in reaching a decision on the merits, and it is the court's 
duty to carefully balance the costs of, against the interests served 
by, abstaining. While it is true that plaintiffs will have to turn 
to state courts for a final judgment, they are assured of a forum 
26. 547 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1976). 
27. 1d. at 1096. 
28. 596 F.2d at 843. 
29. Isthmus Landowners Ass'n v. State of Cal., 601 F.2d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1979). 
30. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579·80 (1973); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage 
Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 328·29 (1964). 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/10
1980] , FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 231 
by having filed complaints in the state courts before the running 
of the statute of limitations. The Sederquist court found that no 
other factors were involved that would justify an immediate adju-
dication by the federal court, the Sante Fe court failed to discuss 
this possibility. Although the facts do not indicate that such fac-
tors exist, the court was remiss in not including a discussion of 
this issue in its opinion. In any case, the plaintiffs retain their 
right to return to federal court if any federal issues remain after 
a state decision.s, 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not choose to 
broaden the scope of abstention in these cases. Although it has 
been suggested that land use is an area of state law which is so 
sensitive that its importance outweighs the outcome of a particu-
lar case, and that whenever a case involves land use· issues ab-
stention should be ordered with no further consideration,32 the 
Ninth Circuit did not so rule. Thus, Sederquist and Sante Fe 
represent the straightforward application of the Pullman absten-
tion doctrine rather than an extension of the circumstances under 
which a federal court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. 
Edward Willner 
II. PLAINTIFF'S FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE IN 
CIVIL SUITS 
A. . INTRODUCTION 
In Campbell v. Gerrans, I the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that a federal district court may not dismiss a civil rights 
action simply because a plaintiff refuses to answer specific inter-
rogatories on fifth amendment grounds. In Campbell, plaintiffs 
sued two San Francisco police officers for assault, invasion of 
privacy, and unjustified seizure of property in connection with a 
warrantless search2 of plaintiffs' automobile, persons, and apart-
31. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. at 416. 
32. See text accompanying notes 17 and 29 supra. 
1. 592 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. Mar., 1979) (per Kerr, D.J., sitting by designation; the 
other panel members were Choy and Sneed JJ.). 
2. Plaintiff Charles Campbell had pled guilty to one count of possession of heroin. 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11550 (Deering 1975). For this and a subsequent violation 
of the same statute, he was sentenced to a term in jail and was later placed on probation. 
9
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ment.3 In the course of that search, defendants discovered several 
articles that could reasonably lead to a finding that either or both 
of the plaintiffs were engaged in the selling of heroin.4 
Plaintiffs brought a civil rights action in federal court.s Dur-
ing discovery proceedings, plaintiffs were served with a total of 
thirty-four interrogatories by the defendants. Of these questions, 
. plaintiffs finally answered thirty and refused to answer four on 
the ground that the answers might contain potentially self-
incriminating evidence.a Although ordered by the court to an-
swer, plaintiffs refused. 
The district court, relying on Lyons v. Johnson,7 ruled that 
plaintiffs' refusal to answer the interrogatories constituted a 
"willful default," and dismissed the action. The court of appeals 
reversed, distinguishing Lyons from the present case, and ruled 
. that plaintiffs' refusal to answer the interrogatories was justified. 
One of the conditions of his probation was that he submit to warrantless searches of his 
person, premises, and automobile. 592 F.2d at 1055. 
3. The other plaintiff in this action was Charles Campbell's wife, Elizabeth. Although 
legally married, the plaintiffs had separated and maintained separate residences since the 
time Charles pled guilty to possession of heroin. The search complained of took place at 
Elizabeth's apartment. It was not a condition of Charles' probation that his wife also 
submit to warrantless searches. Id. 
4. The items seized included the following: 1,682 balloons, a container of lactose, a 
funnel, a strainer, spoons, a savings account passbook, a key to a safety deposit box, and 
a pistol. Two days after the initial search, the defendants searched the safety deposit box 
pursuant to a search warrant and found $2,240. Id. 
5. Federal jurisdiction was predicated on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), which grants fed· 
eral jurisdiction in civil rights actions. 
6. The four Questions which plaintiffs refused to answer were: 
31. In regard to [the items seized by defendants, please 
state 1 a) Who the owner was of said items. . . d) Use to which 
item was to be put by the owner thereof. 
32. Within the two year period preceding July 9, 1973, have 
you ever made a sale of heroin? If so, please state: a) Date of 
sale; b) Name and address of person to whom sale was made; 
c) The Quantity sold. 
33. In regard to [the money seized from plaintiffs' safety de-
posit boxl, please state: a) The owner of said funds; b) Date(s) 
said funds were acquired; d) Whether said funds acquired by 
gift or by exchange of consideration; e) Nature of consideration, 
if appropriate. 
34. In regard to [the money and bank book found on plain-
tiffs' premisesl, please state ... c) Person from whom said 
funds were acquired; d) Whether said funds acquired by gift or 
by exchange of consideration; e) Nature of consideration, if 
appropriate. 
592 F.2d at 1056. 
7. 415 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1027 (1970). 
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B. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
The scope of discovery is limited to matter that is "not 
privileged."8 Thus, information that would tend to be self-
incriminating is clearly not discoverable in a criminal suit.D Until 
the mid-nineteenth century, the fifth amendment was strictly 
construed, and the privilege against self-incrimination did not 
apply in civil suits.1O Since that time, however, the privilege has 
been available to the parties or witnesses in a civil suit as well. II 
The only requirement has been that the answer to a given ques-
tion might lead to information needed to prosecute the party or 
witness of a crime,12 regardless of how remote the possibility of 
prosecution.13 This privilege has been held to be applicable to 
discovery in general and, in particular, will justify the refusal to 
answer interrogatories. 14 
It has been suggested that by bringing or defending a civil 
suit a party waives his privilege against self-incrimination!5 
However, there is no case law holding that by exercising the 
constitutional right to bring or defend a lawsuit, a party must 
automatically waive the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination. 18 If a party has actually waived his fifth amend-
8. FED. R CIV. P. 26(b)(1). What is "privileged" is defined by the rules of evidence. 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507-08 (1947), reh. denied, 336 U.S. 921 (1949). Federal 
common law governs the scope of privilege "in light of reason and experience." FED. R 
EVID. 501 (1975). 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "No person ... shall be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself." 
10. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252, at 325 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
11. [d. at 327 § 2257 n.19. That the privilege against self-incrimination was available 
to civil litigants who might be subject to a criminal action was deemed well established 
by 1924. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924). 
12. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). 
13. For example, in Antonio v. Solomon, 42 F.RD. 320 (D. Mass. 1967), the privilege 
was granted where there was a "remote" possibility that the answer to the challenged 
question might lead to criminal liability . In In re Master Key Litigation, 507 F .2d 292 (9th 
Cir. 1974), the court held that the right to object to questions depended on the possibility 
that criminal liability might result, not the likelihood that such an action would be 
brought. 
14. United States v. 47 Bottles, etc., 26 F.RD. 4 (D.N.J. 1960), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 
953 (1963). 
15. E.g., Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 276-78 
(D.C.N.Y. 1958) where the court cited J. MOORE, FEDERAL RULES AND OFFICIAL FORMS 164 
(1956) as suggesting that "plaintiffs must be deemed to have waived their assumed privi-
leges by bringing [anl action." 22 F.RD. at 276. The court cited no supporting law, 
however, and the court's discussion of waiver was not necessary to the decision. 
16. Jones v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 466 F. Supp. 213, 223 (D. Kan. 1979), citing 
Mitchell v. Roma, 265 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1959). 
11
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ment privilege, however, he may be compelled to answer all rele-
vant questions on pain of contemptY 
The fifth amendment privilege will not excuse a litigant from 
submitting to all discovery. Rather, the party must answer any 
questions which do not raise fifth amendment issues and make a 
proper objection to those questions which do raise such issues. IS 
If the discovering party believes that the claim of privilege is an 
improper one, he may then move to compel discovery.lo If the 
court rules that no fifth amendment privilege applies to a specific 
question, then an order compelling discovery should be issued. 
In the great majority of cases where the issue arises, the party 
claiming the fifth amendment privilege is the defendant. Because 
the plaintiff is a voluntary litigant while the defendant is not, 
courts have often treated the parties differently in terms of the 
right to plead the fifth amendment.2o Although no court has ruled 
that a plaintiff automatically waives the fifth amendment privi-
lege merely by bringing suit, many courts have held that absent 
one narrow exception, plaintiff must either answer all relevant 
questions or face dismissal.21 While the two concepts may appear 
similar at first blush, they are substantially different. If it were 
held that a party waived the privilege by bringing or defending a 
suit, then that party would be forced to answer all questions or 
be held in contempt. On the other hand, the rule that has been 
established by some courts is that a plaintiff cannot be forced to 
provide self-incriminating evidence. That is, a plaintiff has a 
clear choice between maintaining an action and providing self-
incriminating information. 
C. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
Relying on Supreme Court precedent,22 the court of appeals 
held that the privilege against self-incrimination can be asserted 
in any proceeding, civil or criminal. Without discussion or sup-
port for the assertion, the court further held that those cases in 
which sanctions have been imposed for the refusal to answer in-
17. E.g., Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156, reh. denied, 356 U.S. 948 (1958). 
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(2). 
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2). 
20. See Jones v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 466 F. Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1979), and note 
27 infra and accompanying text. 
21. [d. 
22. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972). 
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terrogatories were distinguishable on their facts. The court distin-
guished its prior holding in Lyons v. Johnson,23 upon which the 
lower court based its dismissal, from the present case. In Lyons, 
the plaintiff refused to answer all interrogatories, including those 
questions asking for mere background information. In the present 
case, however, plaintiffs refused to answer only those particular 
questions that obviously raised fifth amendment issues. The 
court failed to draw any other distinctions between the two cases. 
The court decided that whenever a party responds to interro-
gatories with a fifth amendment plea, a court must determine 
whether the answer to a particular question could provide evi-
dence that could be used in a criminal suit against the objecting 
party. A fifth amendment objection would be proper only if the 
answer to a particular question leads to criminal liability. The 
court made no reference to any possible differences between a 
plaintiff's and defendant's right to refuse to answer interrogato-
ries. The court concluded that because plaintiff's assertion of the 
privilege was proper, no sanction could be imposed.24 
D. SIGNIFICANCE 
The Ninth Circuit stands alone in advancing the foregoing 
analysis of plaintiff's right to invoke the fifth amendment privi-
lege in respone to interrogatories. The most obvious difference 
between the rule set forth in Campbell and that established by 
the other circuits is that the Campbell court did not draw any 
distinction between a plaintiff's right to assert the privilege and 
a defendant's right to do SO.25 
The court cited four federal cases purportedly standing for 
the proposition that a party has the right to refuse to answer 
23. 415 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1027 (1970). 
24. The court based this holding on Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, reh. denied, 
381 U.S. 957 (1965), which held that dismissal of a suit in which a proper fifth amendment 
objection has been made is not permissible because that sanction makes the assertion of 
a constitutional privilege "costly." See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967). The 
court relied on cases from the Second Circuit which held that a party's day in court should 
not be denied unless there is a showing of "wiIIful default." Trans World Airlines v. 
Hughes, 332 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1964); Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1957). In each 
of these cases, the party claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege was the defendant. The 
Campbell court did not acknowledge this fact. 
25. For a thorough analysis of the distinction between plaintiffs and defendant's fifth 
amendment privilege, see Jones v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 466 F. Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 
1979). 
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interrogatories on fifth amendment grounds without the possibil-
ity of dismissa1. 26 Each of these cases, however, involved a 
defendant's refusal to answer questions during discovery. While 
it is well established that a defendant has the right to assert his 
fifth amendment privilege in refusing to answer questions during 
discovery, virtually every court which has considered the matter 
has refused to grant this right to a plaintiff. 27 At first glance, this 
may seem to be an unjust view since the two parties are treated 
differently. Since on its face the fifth amendment applies to any-
one who might be made subject to criminal prosecution, the de-
nial of a plaintiffs right to refuse to answer so long as he main-
tains an action may appear to some to be an automatic waiver of 
the privilege. However, no court which has considered the matter 
has construed the privilege in that light. . 
In Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew's, Inc.,28 a New 
York district court drew the distinction between a plaintiff and a 
defendant in a civil suit stating: "It would be uneven justice to 
permit plaintiffs to invoke the powers of this court for the purpose 
of seeking redress and, at the same time, to permit plaintiffs to 
fend off questions, the answers to which may constitute a valid 
defense or materially aid in the defense."28 While plaintiffs are 
voluntary litigants, defendants are not, and to allow plaintiffs to 
use the court both to redress a grievance and to shield itself from 
discovery is substantially unfair. 30 The universal rule is that a 
26. Bowles v. Trowbridge, 60 F. Supp. 48 (C.D. Cal. 1945); United States v. 47 
Bottles, etc., 26 F.R.D. 4 (D.N.J. 1960), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 953 (1963); United States 
v. Fishman, 15 F.R.D. 151 (C.D.N.Y. 1953); Hope v. Burns, 6 F.R.D. 556 (E.D. Ky. 1947). 
27. DeVita v. Sills, 422 F.2d 1172, 1183 (3d Cir. 1970); Lyons v. Johnson, 415 F.2d 
540 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1027 (1970); Penn Communications Specialties, 
Inc. v. Hess, 65 F.R.D. 510 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Brown v. Ames, 346 F. Supp. 1176 (D. Minn. 
1972); Duffy v. Currier, 291 F. Supp. 810 (D. Minn. 1968); Independent Productions Corp., 
v. Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Lund v. Lund, 161 So.2d 873 (1964); 
Stockham v. Stockham, 168 So.2d 320 (1964); Franklin v. Franklin, 365 Mo. 442, 283 
S.W.2d 483 (1955); Levine v. Bornstein, 13 Misc.2d 161, 174 N.Y.S.2d 574, arrd, 7 App. 
Div. 2d 995, 183 N.Y.S.2d 868 (2d Dept.), aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 892, 160 N.E.2d 921, 190 
N.Y.S.2d 702 (1959); Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 545 (1965). . 
The Campbell court relied on Buzard v. Griffin, 89 Ariz. 42, 358 P.2d 155 (1960) in 
holding that a party is sometimes justified in refusing to answer questions propounded 
during discovery proceedings. In Buzard, the party objecting to the questions on fifth 
amendment grounds was a defendant. 
Only one case has held that a plaintiff is generally allowed to refuse to answer discov-
ery on fifth amendment grounds and it has since been overruled. Simkins v. Simkins, 219 
So.2d 724 (1969), reu'd, Minor v. Minor, 240 So.2d 301 (1970). 
28. 22 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). 
29. [d. at 276. 
30. Courts have used various images to illustrate this idea: for example, in Indepen-
14
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plaintiff may not refuse to answer discovery questions and con-
tinue to maintain the action. If a plaintiff does persist in asserting 
the privilege, his action will be dismissed. The courts distinguish 
this from a true waiver because plaintiff is never prevented from 
asserting the privilege by the threat of contempt. 
Although the court failed to draw the essential distinction 
between a plaintiffs and a defendant's right to plead the fifth 
amendment, it must be admitted that if plaintiffs' civil rights 
were violated by the search and seizure, dismissal is too harsh a 
sanction. It does appear, however, that the court's ruling could 
have been justified on other, better established grounds. 
There is an exception by which some circuits allow a plaintiff 
to assert the privilege while maintaining a civil action. 31 In these 
cases, there was an identity of interest between the civil defen--
dants and the potential prosecuting party in the anticipated 
criminal action. This situation frequently occurs when a taxpayer 
sues the Internal Revenue Service for a refund and the United 
States serves interrogatories seeking the source of the income. If 
the income was derived from illegal sources, then the United 
States will have gained information it will need to prosecute the 
civil plaintiff in a related criminal action.32 In Campbell, there 
was not a complete identity between the civil defendant and the 
potential criminal plaintiff only because the government was 
immune from suit when this action was brought.33 It is reasonable 
dent Productions Corp_, the court refused to allow plaintiffs to use the privilege as both a 
"shield and a sword." [d. at 267. Accord, Kisting v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 290 F. Supp. 
141 (W.D (W.D. Wisc. 1968), a/I'd, 416 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1969). In Jones v. B.C. Christo-
pher & Co., 466 F. Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1979), the court refused to allow plaintiff to "have 
his cake and eat it too." 
31. See Thomas v. United States, 531 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1976); Shaffer v. United 
States, 528 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1975); Ianelli v. Long, 487 F.2d 317 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
414 U.S. 1040 (1973). Although no circuit has specifically rejected this exception to the 
general rule that a civil plaintiff must answer questions propounded during discovery or 
face dismissal, not all circuits have considered the matter. In one case that is factually 
similar to Campbell, a district court dismissed an action when the civil plaintiff refused 
to answer specific questions that raised fifth amendment issues. The court did not con-
sider whether that case came within the exception. Brown v. Ames, 346 F. Supp. 1176 (D. 
Minn. 1972). 
32. See Shaffer v. United States, 528 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1975), where the civil plaintiff 
was allowed to refuse to answer discovery questions on the ground that the collection 
procedure was instituted in order to coerce the taxpayer to incriminate himself. 
33. At the time the present suit was instituted in district court, a municipality was 
not considered a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Thus, plaintiffs could not have 
named the City and County of San Francisco as a co-defendant. Moor v. County of 
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Between the time 
15
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to expect that any information defendant police officers obtain 
concerning plaintiffs' use or possession of heroin would be imme-
diately turned over to the prosecutor. Thus, a reasonable analogy 
may be made between the present case and those cases in which 
the civil defendant and the potential criminal plaintiff are identi-
cal. Had the court followed this line of reasoning, the result that 
was reached could have been based on established case law. 
E. CONCLUSION 
In Campbell, the Ninth Circuit has carved out its own rule 
concerning the right of plaintiff to refuse to answer interrogatories 
on fifth amendment grounds. Only the Ninth Circuit has ruled 
that this right exists whenever a plaintiff makes a valid assertion 
of the privilege to a specific question. If the court had intended 
to create its own rule on this issue, an explicit rejection of the 
overwhelming majority rule would have been appropriate. The 
court's failure to recognize the essential distinction between 
plaintiffs and defendant's right to rely on the fifth amendment 
in refusing to answer interrogatories appears to be a major flaw 
in the court's reasoning. Furthermore, if the court had adopted 
the majority view, the same result could have been reached by 
recognizing that the present case falls within an established ex-
ception to that majority rule. 
Edward Willner 
m. IMPLYING PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION IN AREAS 
OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Association v. Hawaiian 
Homes Commission, I the Ninth Circuit considered the impliea-
the suit was brought and the appeal, the Supreme Court overruled that portion of Monroe 
granting absolute immunity to municipalities. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 
436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). Under present law, therefore, San Francisco could have been 
named a co-defendant, thus making the identity between the civil defendant and the 
criminal plaintiff complete. Even if the immunity rule were still followed, the resulting 
lack of identity of parties should not alter plaintiffs' fifth amendment rights. The possibil-
ity of criminal prosecution is as great as it would be if the government were presently a 
co-defendant. 
For a further discussion of a municipality's liabblity in civil rights actions, see Note, 
Municipal Liability for Civil Rights Violations, Ninth Circuit Survey, 10 Golden Gate U. 
L. Rev. 27 (1979). 
1. 588 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. Sept., 1978) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were 
16
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tion of a private right of action and the extension of federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. The action was brought by a group of 
native Hawaiians seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for the 
construction of a flood control project, which was allegedly in 
violation of the Hawaiian Admission Act of 19592 (Admission Act) 
and the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 19213 (Commission 
Act). 
The' Commission Act originally designated 200,000 acres of 
Hawaiian land for the welfare and rehabilitation of native 
Hawaiians. The Admission Act transferred responsibility for the 
home lands to the State of Hawaii. Under section 5(f) of the 
Admission Act, Hawaii is to hold the lands in public trust. The 
United States may sue for any breach of that trust. Since the 
proposed project was to be constructed on twelve acres of native 
home lands, the County of Hawaii turned to the Hawaiian Homes 
Commission, which had the power to lease the land in question. 
The Commission agreed to exchange an amount of home lands for 
equivalent acreage in county land" 
Chambers and Anderson, JJ.), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 49 (1979). 
2. Hawaii Admission Act, 48 U.S.C. Prec. § 491 (Supp. 1979). Section 4 provides, in 
pertinent part, that "as a compact with the United States relating to the management 
and disposition of the Hawaiian home lands, the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, 
as amended, shaH be adopted as a provision of the Constitution of said State .... " [d. 
Section 5(0 provides, in pertinent .part: 
[A]ny such lands and the income therefrom, shall be held by 
said State as a public trust for the support of the public schools 
and other public educational institutions, for the betterment of 
the conditions of native Hawaiians, as defined in the Hawaiian 
Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended, for the develop-
ment of farm and home ownership on as widespread a basis as 
possible for the making of public improvements, and for the 
provision of lands for public use. Such lands, proceeds, and 
income shall be managed and disposed of for one or more of the 
foregoing purposes in such manner as the constitution and laws 
of said State may provide, and their use for any other object 
shall constitute a breach of trust for which suit may be brought 
by the United States. 
[d. The court accepted the validity of the assertion that the home lands may still be used 
lawfully only in the manner set forth in the Commission Act. 588 F.2d at 1218 n.2. 
3. The 1920 Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 691-716 (1952). (The 
current version was incorporated into the Hawaiian Constitution by the Hawaii Admission 
Act, 48 U.S.C. Prec. § 481 (Supp. 1979». 
4. The amount of land was increased to 25 acres. In 1954, Congress amended § 204(4) 
of the Commission Act to permit the Commission, under certain circumstances, to ex-
change property under its jurisdiction for lands of equal value. Act of June 18, 1954, ch. 
319, 68 Stat. 262 (1954). 
17
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The plaintiffs asserted five causes of action in an attempt to 
block the project and to ascertain their rights.5 The Commission 
moved to dismiss the action for lack of federal subject matter 
jurisdiction.6 The district court denied the motion to dismiss and 
held that federal jurisdiction existed since both acts were federal 
statutes. The district court further granted plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment on'four of the five claims.7 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that there 
was no implied private cause of action under the Admission Act. 
The court therefore, found it unnecessary to determine if jurisdic-
tion existed under that Act.8 The court further held that there was 
no federal jurisdiction to consider claims brought under the Com-
mission Act and, therefore, it chose not to confront the issue of 
an implied private cause of action under that Act.B 
B. BACKGROUND: IMPLICATION OF A 'PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION 
In instances where legislation has not explicitly granted an 
individual the right to bring suit, the courts have been faced with 
the task of either denying a private action or deciding under what 
circumstances to imply such a right. The early cases which con-
sidered this issue adopted a liberal stance. IO In 1916, the Supreme 
5. The court described the claims as follows: 
First, plaintiffs claim that the Commission has violated § 
204(4) of the Commission Act by agreeing to exchange lands for 
a purpose other than those permitted by the Act. Second, the 
plaintiffs claim that the Commission has violated § 204(4) by 
permitting the County to render home lands useless for their 
designated purpose without first receiving title to lands re-
ceived in compensation. Third, plaintiffs claim that the Com-
mission violated § 204(4) by failing to obtain the consent of the 
Governor and the Secretary of Interior for the proposed ex-
change. Fourth, plaintiffs allege the project is "illegal" because 
it will consume twice the amount of home lands originally ap-
proved by the Commission. Finally, plaintiffs claim that the 
Commission has violated fiduciary obligations imposed upon it 
by § § 4 and 5 of the Admission Act. 
588 F.2d at 1219. Plaintiffs first, second and third claims were premised on the Commis-
sion Act; the fourth claim was based on both the Admission and Commission Acts; and 
the fifth claim was based on the Admission Act. Id. 
6. Id, at 1220. The Commission relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). 
7. Summary judgment was denied on plaintiffs first claim, which alleged a violation 
of the Commission Act by agreeing to exchange lands for a purpose other than those 
permitted by the Act. 
8. 588 F.2d at 1220. Jurisdiction is a primary requirement. Any order given without 
proper jurisdiction is invalid. See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.7 at 83-84 (1973). 
9. 588 F.2d at 1220. 
10. See penerally Note, Analytical Framework for Implied Causes of Action: Section 
18
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Court in Texas Pacific Railway v. Rigsbyll stated, "in every case, 
where a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a 
person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the 
thing enacted for his advantage .... " Years later, in J.I. Case 
Co. v. Borak, 12 the Court modified the broad guidelines of Rigsby 
by considering whether the chief purpose of the legislation was to 
benefit the plaintiff and whether the implication of a remedy was 
necessary to carry out the congressional purpose.13 
In 1974, however, the Supreme Court shifted away from its 
liberal policy of implying private remedies to a more strict con-
structionist viewpoint. The two leading cases to expound this 
viewpoint were National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National 
Association of Railroad Passengers (Amtrak)!4 and Securities 
Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour (SIPC).I5 
The Court in Amtrak held that no remedy would lie beyond 
that which was expressly stated in the statute. 18 Thus, only the 
Attorney General could maintain a cause of action to enforce the 
terms of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970. Since the Na-
tional Association of Railroad Passengers had not explicitly been 
granted the right to sue, it was precluded from bringing suit 
under that Act. 
Analytically, the importance of the Amtrak decision was its 
dependence upon the old Latin maxim-expressio unius est ex-
17 of the Securities Exchange Act and Redington IJ. Touche Ross & Co., 59 B.U.L. REV. 
157 (1979); Note,Implication of PrilJate Causes of Action from Federal Statutes, 1 J. CORP. 
L. 371 (1976); Note, Implied CilJil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. 
L. REV. 285 (1963). 
11. 241 U.S. 33 (1916) (an employee sought relief in a tort action under criminal 
provisions of the Federal Safety Appliance Act against an interstate railroad). 
12. 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (the Court dealt with remedies under § 14(a) of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act, regarding circulation of misleading proxy materials which de-
prived a stockholder of his preemptive rights). 
13. The Court implied a private remedy even though the legislative history was silent 
on the issue. Id. at 431-32. See Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 
191 (1967) where the Court found an implied right to sue by the Government under § 15 
of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1970). The Act provided for express 
criminal sanctions which the Court felt were inadequate as a remedy. 
14. 414 U.S. 453 (1974), reh. denied, 415 U.S. 952 (1975). The Court refused to imply 
a private right of action for railroad passengers. The Court took the opposite approach 
from the Borak Court, creating a presumption against implication. 
15. 421 U.S. 412 (1975). The Court refused to aHow private actions under the Securi-
ties Investor Protection Act of 1970, which was enforceable by administrative proceedings 
and government suits. 
16. 414 U.S. at 464. 
19
Willner et al.: Federal Practice
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980
242 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:223 
clusio alterus-expression of one remedy is the exclusion of oth-
ers. This principle dictates a narrow statutory application of fed-
erallegislation and greatly reduces the number of potential plain-
tiffs under any act which does not specify precisely who can sue 
to enforce its terms. This principle was followed in SIPC where 
the Court found that an implied private right of action did not 
exist in favor of customers of a failing brokerage house to compel 
SIPC "to exercise its statutory authority for their benefit."17 In 
so deciding, the Court relied heavily upon Amtrak's use of the 
expressio unius rule. 
In the midst of this conflict between liberal application and 
stric.t statutory reading, the Supreme Court in Cart u. Ash,18 set 
forth a four-factor test for determining when an implied private 
right of action should be found: 
[F]irst, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose 
especial benefit the statute was enacted,"-that 
is, does the statute create a federal right in favor 
of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of 
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to 
create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it 
consistent with the underlying purposes of the leg-
islative scheme to imply such a remedy for the 
plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one 
traditionally relegated to state law, in an area bas-
ically the concern of the States, so that it would 
be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based 
solely in federallaw?'9 
The Cart Court concluded that under its test, which had 
been drawn from elements of both previous theories, there was no 
implied private action for damages in favor of stockholders of a 
corporation for corporate violations of a criminal statute which 
prohibited contributions to presidential campaigns. The Su-
preme Court maintained that the expressia unius rule is permiss-
ible when it is supported by legislative history. Silence may be 
17. 421 U.S. at 414. 
18. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Court refused to imply a private cause of action for 
stockholders against corporate directors for violations of a criminal statute which prohib-
ited contributions to presidential campaigns. Fed. Corrupt Practices Act, 18 U.S.C. § 610 
(1970). 
19. 422 U.S. at 78 (citation omitted). The Court held that when it is clear that federal 
law has created rights for a class of persons, "it is not necessary to show an intention to 
create a private cause of action .... " [d. 
20
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used as an indication of legislative intent, but it is not determina-
tive. 20 
In the Supreme Court decision in Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, after applying the four Cort factors, a private right of 
action was implied under Title IX of the Education Amendments 
of 1972.21 However, more recently in Transamerica Mortgage Ad-
visors, Inc. v. Lewis (TAMA),22 the Supreme Court held that 
under the Investment Advisors Act of 194023 a limited private 
right of action was implied for injunctive relief or recission of 
advisory contracts, but no right was implied for damages under 
the Act. The Court did not apply the Cort test but held that the 
ultimate issue was the determination of Congressional intent. No 
further guidelines were given. Both Canon and TAMA were de-
cided after Keaukaha and therefore, are not the focus of this note. 
Nonetheless these decisions indicate a continuing split in the 
Supreme Court on the issue of implying a private right of action. 
C. NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS IN REFUSING TO IMPLY A PRIVATE 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
The decision in Keaukaha not to imply a private cause of 
action was based primarily upon Amtrak's use of the expressio 
unius rule. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the Cort test but 
used it as after-the-fact support rather than as an initial determi-
native tool. 
The Ninth Circuit in Keaukaha has interpreted Cort as re-
jecting the Amtrak approach "requir[ing] the inference of legis-
lative intent not to provide a private remedy."24 However, Cort 
distinguished Amtrak on the ground that its use of the expressio 
unius principle was permissible when specifically supported by 
legislative history. To the Keaukaha court, this distinction con-
20. 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (Powell, J. and White J. filed separate dissents), reversing, 
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976). 
21. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. See text accompanying notes 28 to 31 infra. 
22. No. 77-1645 (Nov. 13, 1979) rev'd, 575 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1978) (White, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion and was joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ.). The dissent 
strongly relies on use of the Cart analysis and would have applied a private right of action 
in this instance. See Touche Ross v. Reddington, No. 78-309 (1979) FED. SEC. L. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 96,894 (June 18, 1979), rev'd, 592 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1978), in which the Court 
refused to imply a private cause of action for damages under § 17(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. 
23. 15 U.S.C. § 806-1 et. seq. (1971). 
24. 588 F.2d at 1222. 
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flicted with "Amtrak's teaching that this inference [expressio 
unius] is operative unless contradicted by 'clear contrary evi-
dence of legislative intent."'25 Thus, apparently in cases where 
there is some legislative comment, the Cort test should be ap-
plied. When there is silence, Amtrak "remains controlling preced-
ent." The Ninth Circuit, however, does not provide support for 
this conclusionary interpretation. 
After holding Amtrak controlling, the court applied the Cort 
test. It agreed that plaintiffs met the first criterion of "being 
members of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was 
enacted." In regard to the second criterion-express or implied 
legislative intent-the Ninth Circuit found only legislative si-
lence. Therefore, it applied expressio unius to deny implication. 
The Ninth Circuit saw the third criterion of "being conso-
nant with the general scheme and purposes of the statute" as a 
close question. However, it felt the issue involved purely 
Hawaiian officials and lands. Thus, no federal purpose would be 
served "by reading a private cause of action into the Admission 
Act." Using the same reasoning, the court held the final criterion 
of "being a concern of the States" dictated against implying a 
private right of action in this factual situation.28 
D. NINTH CIRCUIT'S REASONING IN DENYING A PRIVATE CAUSE OF 
ACTION UNDER THE ADMISSION ACT 
Native Hawaiians are in an analogous position to American 
Indians and logically, therefore, they should be afforded the same 
legal treatment regarding private causes of action.27 A review of 
pertinent. Ninth Circuit decisions regarding implication of private 
rights of action in general and to Indians, in particular, puts 
Keaukaha in sharp contrast with recent trends in federal law. 
Generally, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the use of expressio 
unius. Rather, it has held the initial question to be whether the 
25. [d. (emphasis in original). 
26. [d. at 1224. 
27. See generally Levy, Natiue Hawaiian Land Rights, 63 CAL. L. REV. 848 (1975), in 
which the author states, U[allthough Native Hawaiians cannot properly be called Ameri-
can. Indians in an anthropological sense, the plight of both groups as indigenous peoples 
within the United States calls for analogous legal treatment." [d. at 875. The author 
comments in footnote that U[tlhe United States Supreme Court has never defined the 
term 'Indian' but has implicitly expanded its meaning to include Alaskan Aleuts and 
Eskimos, non Indians under an 'anthropological' meaning." [d., n.215 (citation omitted). 
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statute might be insured fuller effectiveness by allowing a private 
remedy. This kind of reasoning dictates the use of a logical bal-
ancing approach, i.e. the Cort test rather than blind application 
of an outdated Latin maxim. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has 
been especially sensitive to protecting the rights of native Ameri-
cans, specifically American Indians. 
In Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of 
Riverside29 (Agua Caliente), the Ninth Circuit held that "an In-
dian, as the beneficial owner of lands held by the United States 
in trust has a right acting independently of the United States to 
sue to protect his property interests."3o This applicaiton of a "co-
plaintiff" rule was based on a unanimous opinion delivered by 
Chief Justice Earl Warren in Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil CO.31 
In Poafpybitty, Chief Justice Warren stated that "the allot-
ment system was created with the Indians receiving ownership 
rights in the land while the United States retained the power to 
scrutinize the various transactions by which the Indian might be 
separated from that property. "32 It would, in the opinion of the 
Chief Justice, frustrate that purpose to disallow Indians a right 
to bring suit. 
In the present case, the Admission Act provides that the 
home lands are to be held in trust by Hawaii "for the betterment 
of the conditions of native Hawaiians" by the "development of 
farm and home ownership." Any other use would constitute "a 
breach of trust for which suit may be brought by the United 
States."33 Except that in Poafpybitty and Agua Caliente, the 
28. See, e.g., Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974); Burke v. 
Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1970); Matheson v. Armbrust, 
284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960). 
In Stewart, the Ninth Circuit implied a private right of action under the Consumer 
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 167(a), which forbids the discharge of an employee due to 
garnishment of wages for one indebtedness. Use of expressio unius was strictly limited to 
ensuring the full effectiveness of the statute. In Burke, a private civil right was implied 
from a statute containing criminal penalties. The court held that in the absence of clear 
intent to the contrary, courts are free to fashion appropriate remedies. In Matehson, the 
court expressly refused to apply expressio unius and implied a private right of action under 
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
29. 442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972). See also Moses v. 
Kinnear, 490 F.2d 21, 25 (9th Cir. 1973). 
30. 442 F.2d at 1186. 
31. 390 U.S. 365 (1968). 
32. [d. at 369. 
33. 588 F.2d at 1218. 
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trustor was the United States and in Keaukaha it is the State of 
Hawaii, the schemes appear analogous.3• Yet, the outcome is op-
posite. 
In the recent Supreme Court case of Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, 35 the Court affirmed the use of the Cort test rather than 
mere application of the Amtrak approach.3s Justice Stevens, writ-
ing for the majority, signalled the underlying thrust when he 
stated: 
This Court has never refused to imply a cause of 
action where the language of the statute explicitly 
conferred a right directly on a class of persons that 
included the plaintiff in the case. Conversely, the 
Court has been especially reluctant to imply 
causes of action under statutes that create duties 
on the part of persons for the benefit of the public 
at large.37 
The Cannon Court, quoting from Cort, noted "that the legislative 
history of a statute that does not expressly create or deny a pri-
vate remedy will typically be silent or ambiguous on the ques-
tion."38 This was precisely the situation in Keaukaha. 
E. CONCLUSION: DENIAL OF AN IMPLIED PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION 
The Ninth Circuit has based its decision on Amtrak's use of 
expressio unius. This reliance appears misguided. In its decision, 
the court admits that Cort may be read as rejecting the Amtrak 
analysis.3u Within the space of a few paragraphs, the weight af-
forded the Amtrak analysis shifts from "a controlling precedent" 
to "at least one factor" to a "relevant factor" which cannot be 
given heavy reliance"o Further, the Ninth Circuit apparently 
34. See Amicus Brief at 4, Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Ass'n. v. Hawaiian 
Homes Comm'n, 588 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1978), in which the United States Justice Depart-
ment agreed that the present case is analogous to Poafpybitty. 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Helix 
Irrigation Dist., 514 F.2d 465, 470 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1974) stated: 
"Indian bands and tribes have no assurance that all their claims or even all their plainly 
reasonable claims, with respect to trust lands will be pursued in a timely fashion by the 
United States." 
35. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
36. Justice Powell wrote a strong dissent as to overuse of the test. 99 S. Ct. at 1974. 
37. 99 S. Ct. at 1954 n.13 (citations omitted). 
38. 99 S. Ct. at 1956. 
39. 588 F.2d at 1222. 
40. [d. at 1222-1223. 
24
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/10
1980] FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 247 
feels that courts may choose either Cort or Amtrak. Yet, nowhere 
in Keaukaha or in Cort is there any support for the notion that 
Amtrak remains a controlling precedent when legislation is silent 
on rights of action. 
Cort logically stands as stronger authority. It was Cort which 
expanded and set forth principles for determining when a private 
right of action is available. Under this test, Amtrak can be used 
for support if there is legislative comment. Cort is the test and 
Amtrak is only available for support-not the reverse, as 
Keaukaha purports. 
Assuming that Cort is the appropriate test, an application of 
its factors leads to a conclusion opposite to that reached by the 
Ninth Circuit. First, there is no debate that plaintiffs are mem-
bers of the class for whose benefit the legislation was enacted. 
Second, regarding legislative intent, the legislative history here is 
silent. It should be noted that the Ninth Circuit stated this si-
lence was to be expected considering the nature of the Admission 
Act. Yet, the court insisted upon applying expressio unius. The 
only logical conclusion which can be drawn from legislative si-
lence is ambiguity or neutrality. Thus, this factor neither sup-
ports implication nor denial of a private right. Third, regarding 
consonance with the general scheme of the legislation, implica-
tion is clearly favored here. The Ninth Circuit has decided the 
issue based on some notion of the rights and laws of Hawaii. Yet, 
the purpose of the legislation is the rehabilitation of native 
Hawaiians, not support of Hawaiian laws. 
Finally, consideration was given to whetherr this area is basi-
cally the concern of the states, as a group. In its opinion, the 
Ninth Circuit asked whether the issue is a concern of Hawaii. 
This substitution of words misdirects attention away from the 
underlying nature of the concern. It is obvious Hawaii as a state 
has concerns in the litigation, yet, the underlying nature of the 
concern is the assurance of the rights of a specific minority. This 
essential concern is not particular to Hawaii. It is a truly national 
concern and should be dealt with by a federal court. 
Additionally, support can be found in Justice Stevens' com-
ment in Cannon regarding implying private causes of action when 
25
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the rights of a class are involved.4! Cases which have dealt with 
the issue of implying private rights of action divide roughly into 
those which have revolved around financial concerns and those 
which have revolved around issues of class discrimination. In the 
former, for example, Amtrak, SIPC, and TAMA, courts have 
been reluctant to imply private rights of action. In the latter, for 
example, Cannon, Poafpybitty and Agua Caliente, courts have 
been more willing to imply such rights of action. 
Therefore, Keaukaha should be examined both under the 
Cort test and as a case which clearly revolves around class dis-
crimination. Thus, a private right of action should be implied to 
protect the purposes of the legislation and the rights of the native 
Hawaiians. 
F. FEDERAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
The court in Keaukaha held that those claims which were 
based on the Commission Act could not be decided because the 
district court was without jurisdiction.42 The court noted that in 
determining whether federal jurisdiction existed it must deter-
mine whether the claims "arise under" the laws of the United 
States. T9 determine this, the court relied upon the "common-
sense" advice of Justice Cardozo43 where he stated that the fed-
eral nature of the right to be established is decisive-not the 
source of the authority establishing it. This is basically the ap-
proach used by the Ninth Circuit in League to Save Lake Tahoe 
v. B.J.K. Corporation,U a ruling prior to Keaukaha. 
The court's denial of federal jurisdiction under the Commis-
sion Act appears correct. One danger in determining federal 
"nature" is that a court may look too narrowly at the face of the 
complaint. However, in Keaukaha, the court pragmatically 
looked well beyond the pleadings}5 Additionally, the Commission 
Act has not formally been repealed and an argument could be 
41. 441 U.s. at 690·93 n.13. 
42. 588 F.2d at 1224. 
43. Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 116 (1936), quoting Puerto Rico v. 
Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 483 (1932). 
44. 547 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of determining jurisdiction see 
Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That A Case Arise 'Directly' Under 
Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890 (1967); Miskin, The Federal Question in the District 
Courts, 53 COL. L. REV. 157 (1953). 
45. The court examined the history and nature of the Commission Act and Admission 
Act as well as requesting an Amicus Brief from the Justice Department. 
26
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/10
1980] FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 249 
made to justify jurisdiction on that basis. However, for all intents 
and purposes, the Commission Act has been subsumed by the 
Admission Act. 48 To grant jurisdiction under this argument would 
be an unwise affirmation of technicalitiesY 
G. CONCLUSION 
It appears that native Hawaiians may still raise claims based 
on the Commission Act in a state court. However, they will still 
face the obstacle of showing that a private cause of action is 
implied under that Act. It is unclear why the Hawaiians chose to 
litigate in federal court. Past treatment of native Hawaiians, plus 
ever-encroaching progress may suggest that a federal court would 
have been a more neutral forum. Hawaii is a state plagued by 
rising land costs. Its dependence upon tourism multiplies this 
problem. Faced with Hawaii's need to make land available for 
state income and the decision in Agua Caliente, which appeared 
to recommend a federal forum for native Americans, petitioners 
may have seen the federal forum as more receptive. 
It is difficult for the practitioner to draw guidelines from 
Keaukaha. It is unclear why, in examining the Admission Act, 
the threshold question was whether a private right of action was 
implied and why, in examining the Commission Act, the thresh-
old question was the existence of federal jurisdiction. One possi: 
ble lesson is that, even though Canon is a subsequent decision, 
the Ninth Circuit may justifiably imply private rights of action 
more frequently when issues of discrimination are involved. How-
ever, the recent Ninth Circuit decision in Town of Greenhorn v. 
Baker County, Oregon48 may indicate that instead of reaching a 
decision on implication of a private right of action, the court may 
simply refuse to find federal jurisdiction. 
Edmund Scott 
46. Section 4 of the Admission Act provides that the Commission "shall be adopted 
as a provision of the Constitution of said State .... " 
47. If the court were to allow jurisdiction on this ground, it could open a flood gate 
of litigation based upon obscure law. This is contrary to modern federal civil procedure. 
48. 596 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. Apr., 1979). The court held that although asserted rights 
originated under an act of Congress, there was no federal jurisdiction to hear the claims 
brought by beneficiaries of a trust established by the Townsite Act, 43 U .S.C. § 718 (1964) 
(repealed prospectively, 1976). The claims revolved around title to land within the county. 
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IV. ATIORNEY'S FEES: SURVIVAL OF THE "COMMON 
FUND" EXCEPTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In City of Klawock v. Gustafson, I the Ninth Circuit consid-
ered the application of the "common fund" exception2 to the 
general rule denying the award of attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party in the absence of a statutory or valid contractual provision. 
The City of Klawock, located on Prince of Wales Island in 
Southeastern Alaska, commenced an action to obtain title to cer-
tain vacant lots within its boundaries. The land had been re-
served for territorial townsites under the Native Townsite Act of 
1926 and the general Alaska townsite legislation.3 A statutory 
trustee· was appointed to administer the property. For a number 
of years, the townsite had undergone a series of subdivisions and, 
in 1974, all subdivision plans for the townsite were completed. 
The trustee issued deeds to the occupants of the newly sub-
divided lots. Thereafter, the City of Klawock sued the trustee, 
the Secretary of Interior and the non-native occupants of four-
teen lots claiming that (1) non-natives could not occupy the lots 
in question, and (2) the trustee failed to deed the vacant lots to 
the city.5 
The trustee's actions were consistent with a 1959 Deputy So-
licitor's opinion issued by the Interior Department, involving an-
other townsite, which required the trustee to retain title to all 
1. 685 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. Nov., 1978) (per Goodwin, J.; the other panel members 
were Wright, and Anderson, JJ.). 
2. For a discussion of the general rule and its exception, see Dawson, Lawyers and 
Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1597 (1974); Note, At-
torney Fees: Exception to the American Rule, 25 DRAKE L. REv. 717 (1976); Note, Reim-
bursement for Attorneys' Fees from the Beneficiaries of Representative Litigation, 68 
MINN. L. REv. 933 (1974); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access 
to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636 (1974). 
3. The Native Townsite Act of 1926, 43 U.S.C. § 735 (1969), and the general Alaska 
Townsite Legislation, 48 U.S.C. § 355 (1969), were both subsequently repealed by Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94·579, 90 Stat. 2789 (1976). 
4. George Gustafson, the trustee, had argued that the fees could not be awarded 
because the other native townsites were indispensable parties and had not been joined. 
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument noting that the claim was not against the other 
cities but the common fund in the trustee's hands. The trustee was, therefore, held to be 
an indispensable party because he controlled the fund. The other cities, not being liable 
for fees, were not indispensable. 585 F.2d at 432. 
5. Id. at 429. 
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lots until they were occupied.8 The city, however, claimed that 
these actions were contrary to actions of trustees in other states 
where municipalities were held entitled to all unoccupied lots or 
to their economic benefit.7 
The parties allowed litigation to rest pending administrative 
review by the Interior Department's Board of Land Appeal 
(BLA). The BLA upheld the trustee's position with respect to 
the lots occupied by non-natives; it did not decide the status of 
the unoccupied lots. The district court upheld the BLA ruling 
concerning the occupied lots and further held the trustee had au-
thority to deed the 333 vacant lots to the city.s 
The city appealed that part of the district court's decision 
denying it title to the fourteen occupied lots. At the same time, 
the Regional Solicitor issued an opinion allowing the trustee to 
deed the vacant lots directly to the city rather than requiring the 
trustee to put them up for auction.9 Having prevailed with re-
gard to the 333 vacant lots, the city stipulated to dismissal of its 
appeal. 10 
The attorneys for Klawock, on their own behalf, then peti-
tioned the district court for an award of attorneys' fees, main-
taining that the vacant lots deeded to the city constituted a 
common fund from which their fees could be paid. II The district 
court denied the petition, emphasizing the part of its decision 
denying title to the fourteen occupied lots. 12 In addition, since 
conveyance of the vacant lots in Klawock and other townsites 
was the result of an administrative opinion, the court held that 
the trustee was without authority to pay the fees. 13 The attorneys 
for Klawock appealed. 
6. [d. The 1959 Deputy Solicitor's opinion concerned the townsite of Saxon. 
7. [d. Without citing the Deputy Solicitor's opinion, the court noted that the Deputy 
Solicitor had taken the position that special rules applied to native townsites in Alaska. 
No discussion of those rules was undertaken by the district court. 
8. [d. at 430. 
9. [d. 
10. [d. 
11. The vacant lots which comprise the fund are not just the 333 lots in Klawock, 
but all vacant lots which are or could be conveyed to all other cities as a result of the 
Klawock action. [d. at 432. 
12. [d. at 430. The district court's reason not to hold the city as the prevailing party 
was based on the fact that the city had not prevailed in its action to gain title to the 
fourteen occupied lots. [d. 
13. [d. 
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B. BACKGROUND 
The "American" rule against the allowance of attorney's 
fees provides that a prevailing party cannot recover costs against 
a losing party, in the absence of a statute or contractual provi-
sion.'4 Recently, the United States Supreme Court in Alyeska 
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society l5 reaffirmed the via-
bility of the American rule. However, it recognized several equit-
ability nonstatutory exceptions, notably the century-old common 
fund doctrine. 16 
The doctrine provides that "a private plaintiff, or his attor-
ney, whose efforts create, discover, increase or preserve a fund to 
which others also have a claim is entitled to recover from the 
fund the costs of his litigation, including attorney's fees. "17 The 
concept is based in equity and seeks to prevent unjust enrich-
ment of persons who did not participate in litigation. 
14. 6 J. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, ~ 54.77 [2}, at 1705-6 (2d ed. 1976). For a 
general discussion of the American rule and its exceptions, see authorities cited at note 
2 supra. 
15. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). In Alyeska, the Supreme Court denied the award of fees 
under a "private attorney general" theory, which in effect compensates plaintiffs who 
incur expenses in litigation to vindicate a public right. The Court, however, reaffirmed 
the use of common benefit doctrine and bad faith exception. Id. at 257-58. 
Attorneys for the City of Klawock did not present their claime under a substantial 
benefit (common benefit) theory, an extension of the common fund exception. This ex-
ception operates under the same equitable rationale as the common fund doctrine. It was 
devised to permit award of fees in cases not covered by the common fund doctrine be-
cause of the lack of a monetary fund but "yet involving interests of broad public impor. 
tance, interests that Congress sought to vindicate at least in part through private litiga. 
tion." Vincent v. Hughes Airwest, Inc., 557 F.2d at 768·69 n.7 (1977). See Hall v. Cole, 
412 U.S. 1 (1973) where a union member who had been expelled by his union for criticiz-
ing union activities sued and the Court found attorneys' fees to be justified because not 
only had the plaintiff vindicated his own free speech rights, but he had "necessarily ren-
dered a substantial service to his union as an institution and to all of its members." Id. 
at 8. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), where stockholders brought 
a derivative suit on behalf of minority stockholders to set aside a merger on the grounds 
of misleading proxy statements. Attorney's fees were granted. Id. at 390. The Court held 
the actual existence of a monetary fund was unnecessary if litigation conferred a "sub-
stantial benefit on the members of an ascertainable class." Id. at 394. The Court held the 
benefit conferred was the vindication of the "fair and informed corporate sufferage .... " 
Id. at 396. 
See generally Lipson, Beyond Alyeska-Judicial Response to the Civil Rights Attor-
neys' Fees Act, 22 ST. LoUIS U.L.J. 243 (1978); Malson, In Response to Alyeska-The 
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 430 (1977); Note, Alyeska Pipeline Ser-
vice co. v. Wilderness Society: The Demise of the Private Attorney General Theory as a 
Basis for Awarding Attorneys Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 11 TULSA L.J. 420 (1976). 
16. The first case to establish the common fund doctrine was Trustees v. Greenough, 
105 U.S. 527 (1881). See note 18 infra and accompanying text. 
17. Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th Cir. 1977) (emphasis 
added). 
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In the landmark case of Trustees v. Greenough,18 the Su-
preme Court allowed a bondholder, who was successful in a suit 
brought against the trustees of a bond-guarantee fund, to recover 
his expenditures for attorney's fees from the trust property. The 
court reasoned that if the trustee had performed his duties, his 
charges would have been levied against the trust. Therefore, 
since the bondholder merely performed the duties of the trustee, 
to deny the bondholder his attorney's fees would have been un-
fair and would have resulted in a windfall to the other 
beneficiaries. 18 
The Court has expanded the common fund doctrine, approv-
ing not only the claims of a client to reimbursement of attorney's 
fees, as in Greenough, but also, to the claims of an attorney to a 
share of the wealth.20 Equity is central to an understanding of 
the doctrine; it thereby attempts to spread litigation costs 
among all beneficiaries of an action on a theory that those who 
share the benefit should also share the burden.21 
18. 105 U.S. 527 (1881). 
19. Id. at 532. 
20. Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1884). In Pettus, several 
unsecured creditors of a railroad company sued to establish a lien upon railroad property. 
The suit was successful and the attorneys were allowed fees derived from benefits con-
ferred upon all creditors as well as from their own clients. 
One commentator, criticizing Pettus as "leaping a gulf' and creating an independent 
right of a lawyer to share in the wealth of a stranger, stated: 
The Pettus case totally transformed [the claim of a client for 
contribution to the litigation costs that he had incurred, as 
recognized in Greenough,] into an independent right of the 
lawyer, reinforced by lien, to an extra reward so that he might 
share the wealth of strangers. The lawyer was suddenly 
thought of as producer of this wealth, though he did nothing 
more than perform his contract with his own client, and fur-
thermore had been paid by his client in full the sum he had 
agreed to accept. 
Dawson, supra note 2, at 1603-04. 
The principals of the Greenough and Pettus cases were extended by the Supreme 
Court in Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939). In Sprague, the Court dealt 
with a situation in which a prevailing party did not purport to sue as a class representa-
tive. A trustor brought suit to establish a lien on funds she had deposited in a bank 
which had become bankrupt. Her successful suit established by stare decisis the· rights of 
fourteen other trusts pertaining to the same bonds. In allowing attorney fees to be 
awarded out of the proceeds of the bonds, the Supreme Court stressed the trial court's 
power of equity to act in this situation regardless of litigation formalities. 
21. Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th Cir. 1977). See also In 
re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades, 549 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1977). For a discus-
sion of California law relating to the common fund doctrine, see Quinn v. California, 15 
Cal. 3d 162, 539 P.2d 761, 124 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975), while ostensibly based upon CAL. LAs. 
CODE § 3856 (1971), laid out the equitable foundation of the doctrine. 
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C. NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDING 
The Ninth Circuit held that the policy change represented 
by the Regional Solicitor's 1977 opinion, allowing the 333 vacant 
lots to be directly deeded to the city, was the direct result of 
"litigation commenced and prosecuted by the [city 1 attorneys in 
this case"22 The court noted that due to the efforts of the city 
attorneys, other native townsites will receive similar economic 
benefits; and therefore, attorney's fees could properly be 
awarded under the common fund doctrine even though the 
change was accomplished administratively rather than judi-
cially, Despite the facts, that the case ended in a settlement, and 
that the attorneys represented municipal, not private litigants, 
the Ninth Circuit felt the common fund doctrine still applied. 
In reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit relied heav-
ily upon Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.,23 in determining that 
the necessary elements for the common fund doctrine were pre-
sent.24 It noted with approval the doctrine's equitable rationale, 
as expressed in Vincent, that those who share the benefit should 
share the cost.25 While Vincent indicated fees could be awarded 
22. 585 F.2d at 430. 
23. 557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977). 
24. The Vincent court listed the following elements: 
(1) the original client's attorney's fees were not shifted to-or 
the attorney's personal claim for an extra fee was not lodged 
against-the adversary losing party; rather, fees were shifted 
to third parties who were beneficiaries of the fund in some 
way; 
(2) no contractual relationship existed between the original 
attorneys and the third parties; 
(3) the beneficiaries were required to pay litigation costs in 
proportion to the benefits that the litigation produced for 
them; 
(4) where the third parties had hired their own attorneys and 
appeared in the litigation, the original claimant could not shift 
to them his attorney's fees; 
(5) the third parties were not personally liable for the litiga-
tion costs and any claim was to be satisfied out of the fund; 
(6) there must exist some identifiable assets on which a court 
could impose a charge, although the concept of "fund" was 
flexible and it was settled that a money judgment or even a 
settlement could serve as a fund; and 
(7) the court could legitimately exercise authority or control 
over the asset. 
1d. at 770. Of importance to the Vincent court was the presence of certain factors, specifi. 
cally that there be a shift of fees to all beneficiaries and that there is an identifiable fund 
upon which the court can exercise legitimate control. 
25. 585 F.2d at 431. 
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after settlements,28 the Klawock court firmly established rule in 
the Ninth Circuit27 allowing an award of attorney's fees in such 
situations. To insist upon total adjudication would result in un-
necessary litigation.Z8 
The Klawock court, analogizing to the effect of stare decisis 
in Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l. Bank,29 took the next step and held 
that change in administrative policy justified award of fees when 
a benefit was clearly bestowed upon others who had not actively 
sought that change.30 Fees are to come from the fund estab-
lished by the attorney's efforts, but "it is not necessary for the 
beneficiaries to be parties to the proceedings at all."31 Attorney's 
fees could, therefore, be awarded from "those lots actually in the 
trustee's hands at the time of the court's decision."32 
By allowing attorney's fees in this situation, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has implicitly allowed those who are eligible to receive fees 
to include attorneys representing governmental bodies as well as 
private parties. 
D. DISCUSSION 
In deciding whether an award of attorney's fees is proper in 
the Ninth Circuit, the Klawock decision maintains that the fo-
cus of inquiry shall be on general principles of equity; in other 
words, has a benefit been conferred due to the efforts of the peti-
tioning attorneys. In support of this reasoning, Klawock relies 
upon Sprague and Vincent. 
In both Sprague and Klawock, persons or entities had bene-
fited due to the efforts of another party. In neither case did the 
active party sue as a representative of the non-participating ben-
26. 557 F.2d 759, 771 (9th Cir. 1977). 
27. 585 F.2d at 428. See also In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades, 529 F.2d 
1006 (5th Cir. 1977) where that circuit independently concurred with Vincent and 
awarded attorney's fees to lead counsel. See text accompanying> notes 33 and 34 supra. 
28. 585 F.2d at 431. Cf, Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d eir. 
1977) (noted with approval the desirability of settlements as opposed to litigation). 
29. 307 U.S. 161 (1939). See note 20 supra. 
30. 585 F.2d at 431. The court held that the situation in Sprague was precisely on 
point and, therefore, Sprague was controlling. The court notes possible undesirable ef-
fects may result from award of attorney's fees in these situations but that, in this case, 
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eficiaries who received the benefit. While in Sprague the nature 
of the doctrine was set out by Justice Frankfurter regarding 
award from a fund already in existence, Klawock faced the 
dilemma that there was no fund yet in existence. However, by 
relying on the broad application of the doctrine in Vincent, 
where the court faced a similar seemingly lack of a fund 
Klawock was able to "discover" such a fund and focus on the 
nature of the doctrine in awarding fees. 
The situation in Vincent was somewhat different. In Vin-
cent, more than sixty actions were brought against Hughes Air 
West by the next-of-kin of victims of an air crash. The actions 
were consolidated and fees were awarded to four law firms 
which, at the direction of the district court, had comprised a 
"committee of lead counsel." This committee conducted discov-
ery, pretrial motions and settlement negotiations. Fees were 
awarded, not from the existing fund, as in Sprague, but from a 
awarded percentage of the negotiated settlements. 
The Vincent court noted that a crucial element of the com-
mon fund doctrine is the existence of a fund. However, applying 
a broad view, existence of the fund may arise after the action as 
well as prior to it. The focus of Vincent is clearly on the equit-
able nature of the claim. In affirming the district court, Vincent 
stated that the district court clearly "proceeded on concepts of 
quasi-contract and restitution .... "33 and that lead counsel 
"engaged in substantial work after their appointment that 
benefitted all claimants."34 
While other elements of the doctrine would be considered, 
it is the purpose of the doctrine which is to prevail.35 Apply-
ing this reasoning, the Klawock court announced its rule that 
fees may be awarded even if litigation has not. been fully con-
cluded. Affirming Vincent, it firmly established that fees may be 
awarded after settlements38 arid that fees may be awarded in 
33. 557 F.2d at 770. 
34. [d. at 772. 
35. [d. 
36. See Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Glen 
Alden Corp. v. Kahan, 398 U.S. 950 (1970), where the court held that in order to recover 
legal fees, it is not necessary that suit be brought to a successful completion, since such a 
requirement might discourage prompt settlements. The court maintained that it is only 
necessary to determine that the suit was meritorious and that plaintiff's efforts resulted 
in benefit to others. In Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 33 Del. Ch. 282, 92 A.2d 295 (1952), the 
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cases which result in purely administrative decisions.37 This 
holding is clearly consistent with the underlying rationale of the 
doctrine. If one party's efforts have created a benefit for others, 
the principles of unjust enrichment dictate that the non-
participating party should not receive that benefit at the expense 
of the active party . The focus is on avoidance of unjust 
enrichment, not on maintenance of legal formlaities. Therefore, 
the type of proceeding in which the change occurred should not 
determine the line between granting and not granting fees.38 
The class of persons who could recover has been expanded 
from private parties acting as their own attorneys, to attorneys 
for private parties whose actions resulted in benefits to others 
and, now, to attorneys who represent public bodies. Given the 
underlying rationale of the doctrine, there is no reason not to 
award attorneys' fees to such plaintiffs. In Lafferty v. 
Humphrey3' the attorneys for Clackamas County, Oregon suc-
cessfully sued to have certain land grant funds distributed to 
several counties. The District of Columbia Circuit held that the 
attorneys for the County of Clackamas were entitled to recover 
fees regardless of the fact that they represented government enti-
ties. The factual situation and reasoning in Lafferty is suffi-
ciently similar to hold that municipalities may recover reasona-
plaintiff stockholder was awarded reasonable investigation fees, including attorney's fees. 
The court stressed the same benefit was accrued whether it was produced as a result of 
the demand or by successful litigation. 
37. This is not to be confused with situations in which fees are awarded by a partic-
ular administrative agency. This practice has generally been denied to such bodies, ab-
sent statutory authority. See Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm'n 669 
F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd en banc, 559 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1086 (1978), which held that absent statutory authority, the Federal Power Commis-
sion had no inherent authority to award costs. See also Turner v. FCC, 514 F.2d 1354 
(D.C. Cir. 1975). 
But see Comment, Funding Public Participation in Agency Proceedings, 27 AMER. 
U.L. REv. 981 (1978), noting support given by the Comptroller General of the United 
States that federal agencies have inherent statutory authority to reimburse public par-
ticipants. See also Comment, Inducement of Public Participation in Administrative Pro-
ceedings Through the Award of A ttomey 's Fees, 30 BAYLOR L. REv. 785 (1978). 
38. In D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d I, 520 P.2d 10, 112 Cal. 
Rptr. 786 (1974), the California Supreme Court, while denying award of fees, acknowl-
edged the existence of the substantial benefit theory as an exception to the American 
Rule. See also Mandel v. Hodge, 54 Cal. App. 3d 596, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1976), per-
mitting award of fees under a substantial benefit theory in a state employee's successful 
suit against his employer. 
39. 248 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 869 (1957). See also National 
ABs'n of Regional Medical Programs, Inc. v. Weinberger, 396 F. Supp. 842 (D.D.C. 1975). 
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ble attorney's fees under the common fund doctrine. This is 
logical since municipalities have the capacity to sue and be 
sued,40 and therefore possess the "usual incidents of suits in rela-
tion to the payments of costs and allowances."41 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Klawock court reaffirmed the viability of the common 
fund doctrine in the Ninth Circuit. The decision has also 
extended the situations in which recovery can be made and the 
classes of persons who may be entitled to such recovery. This is 
a clear indication to the practitioner that courts in this circuit 
will favorably42 consider claims for fees by attorneys whose work 
may have benefited persons other than their own clients. 
Edmund Scott 
V. THE STANDARD OF LIABILITY OF AN ACCOUNTANT 
UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW IN AN SEC 
INJUNCTIVE ACTION 
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Arthur Young & 
Co., I the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to apply the 
Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC or the Commission) 
proposed standard for evaluating the conduct of accountants. 
The Commission urged the acceptance of a standard whereby 
accountants would be liable for violation of the federal securities 
law if their audit, as reflected in financial statements, failed to 
present a reasonably accurate picture of present and future risks 
that would face the potential ordinary investor.2 
40. See 6 J. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, ~~ 17.23, 54.75(5) (2d ed. 1976). In East 
Peoria v. Tazewell·County, 60 Ill.2d 263, 327 N.E.2d 331 (1975), two municipalities and 
two school districts filed a declaratory judgment action cha\lenging the constitutionality 
of a county ordinance imposing a service charge on a\l municipal corporations over tax 
assessing, billing, etc. The lower court held the ordinance unconstitutional but denied 
award of fees. On appeal, it was held that plaintiff's attorneys successfully prevented the 
unlawful diversion of funds and that they were entitled to an allowance of fees. 
41. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. J.G. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81, 85 (1941). 
42. See Reiser v. Del Monte, 605 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1979), in which the 
court recognized the common benefit doctrine for attorney's fees award in a class action 
derivative suit where the attorneys had not sued as a representative of a class. 
1. 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. Feb., 1979) (per Sneed, J.; the other panel members were 
Choy, J., and Waters, D. J.). 
2. [d. at 787. 
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The Arthur Young accounting firm (Arthur Young) was 
named as a party defendant in a trial court action due to its 
association with its client, Jack Burke. During the 1960's, Burke 
formed investment programs, and promoted and sold interests in 
these programs as a means to finance exploration for oil and gas.3 
The accounting firm was hired in 1966 to audit the programs and 
certify their financial statements.4 The firm continued in its ca-
pacity as auditor for the various investment programs for about 
five years. 
The Commission alleged that the Arthur Young accounting 
examination, a necessary prerequisite to the firm's certification 
of financial statements, was faulty." The claimed defect con-
cerned an "inadequate audit" of Fundamental, a Burke-
controlled corporation that was integrally connected to the in-
vestment programs. 8 The Commission further contended that 
Arthur Young knew or should have known of "improper prac-
tices" and material misstatements and omissions by Burke in 
connection with the investment programs he promoted.7 There-
3. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715, 722 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Burke 
formed the JB and Geotek investment programs, 
4. 1d. at 729. 
5. 1d. at 730-31. An extensive accounting examination was undertaken. Following this 
examination, Arthur Young certified the financial statements. The certifications stated 
that: 1) Arthur Young examined the programs' receipts and disbursements in accordance 
with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS); 2) the examination included the 
necessary tests and procedures prescribed under those standards; and 3) in their opinion, 
there was a fair presentation according to generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP). 1d. at 730. 
The GAAS and GAAP standards are promulgated by the American Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accountants. [d. at 730 n.10. For a discussion of these standards, see Strother, 
The Establishment of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and Generally Accepted 
Auditing Standards, 28 VAND. L. REV. 201 (1975). 
6. 426 F. Supp. at 731. The funds of all the programs were channeled through Funda-
mental. The Commission stated that Fundamental was engaging in Geotek program activ-
ities which were inconsistent with its role as represented in the prospectus. The Commis-
sion's position was that Arthur Young knew or should have known that Burke did not 
disclose the significance of the role played by Fundamental. Specifically, the Commission 
alleged that Burke misstated: 
[d. at 732. 
i) that Fundamental was acting as "operator" for the Geotek 
programs, 
ii) that Fundamental was holding legal title to the Geotek 
program properties, 
iii) that Fundamental was receiving and holding "advance" 
disbursements . . ., 
iv) that Fundamental was pledging program properties as col-
lateral for bank loans. 
7. 1d. at 730. The Commission alleged in their brief that Arthur Young knew of the 
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fore, according to the Commission, Arthur Young misstated in 
the audit report certifications that it complied with generally 
accepted accounting principles and generally accepted auditing 
standards.s This misstatement, as well as the "inadequate 
audit," constituted a violation of the federal securities laws.s 
The trial court found that Arthur Young neither violated the 
securities laws nor aided and abetted violation of those laws,IO 
thus denying the remedy of an injunction against future viola-
following "improper practices": 
1. Burke backdated checks to mislead investors as to tax de· 
ductions. 
2. Burke commingled money and property of the programs 
with his own. 
3. Burke sold property he knew was worthless to the pro· 
grams. 
4. Burke failed to disclose management expenses. 
Brief for Appellee at 6, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Cal. 
1976). 
8. 426 F. Supp. at 730. See note 5 supra. 
9. 590 F.2d at 786. Specifically, Arthur Young was charged with violating sections 
17(a), 10(b), 15(d), and 13(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act and rule 10b·5, promul. 
gated under section 10(b) of the Act. 
Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1978), 
applies to the offer or sale of securities and makes it unlawful 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue state· 
ment of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact 
... or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the 
purchaser. 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U .S.C. § 78j(1978), makes it 
unlawful 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or 
any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula· 
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro· 
priate in the public interest or for protection of investors. 
Rule 10b·5, promulgated under 10(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b·5(1979), makes it unlawful 
to omit or misstate a material fact "in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security." 
Section 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(1978), requires an issuer of a registered security to 
file information and documents as the Commission prescribes, which may include the 
filing of reports certified by independent public accountants. 
Section 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 780(d)(1978), concerns the filing ofregistration statements 
and supplemental reports in accordance with rules and regulations the Commission may 
prescribe. 
10. 426 F. Supp. at 730. 
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tions which the Commission sought,,1 The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed, stating that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
refusing to enjoin the defendants. 12 The court based its affirmance 
on the ground that the trial court's failure to adopt the Commis-
sion's standard, whereby the audit statements must 'reflect the 
present and future risks of investment, did not constitute error. 13 
A. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit dealt primarily with the appropriate legal 
standard against which to measure the performance of an auditor 
under the federal securities laws. If the trial court imposed too 
Iowa standard, then failure to enjoin the defendants might have 
been an abuse of discretion. However, the appellate court empha-
sized that even if there was a past violation of the securities laws, 
this factor alone did not mean that an injunction must follow,, 4 
In order for the Commission to prevail on appeal, the court 
stated, the Commission must show "no reasonable basis for the 
district judge's decision."15 
The court assumed that a finding of mere negligence, rather 
than scienter, could justify the issuance of an injunction. 16 The 
issue thus presented on appeal was whether the trial court ap-
plied too Iowa standard in evaluating the accountants' conduct 
to determine if they negligently violated the securities laws. 17 
The court noted that it was not exactly clear what standard 
the trial court applied when it concluded that Arthur Young was 
not negligent. 18 However, it was clear that the lower court did not 
11. [d. at 731. 
12. 590 F.2d at 789. 
13. [d. 
14. [d. An injunction is appropriate when there is a reasonable likelihood of future 
violation. In Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977), 
although the defendant violated the securities laws, the Second Circuit found he was 
unlikely to repeat the violation and upheld the trial judge's denial of injunctive relief. [d. 
at 18. 
15. 590 F.2d at 787. 
16. [d. In Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court held that 
scienter was necessary for liability to be imposed in a private action for damages under § 
10(b) of the securities laws. The Court left open the question of whether scienter is 
necessary in an injunctive action. 
17. 590 F.2dat 787. 
18. [d. at 788. The evidence at trial included expert testimony that Arthur Young 
complied with professional standards (GAAS and GAAP). Basically, the Commission's 
position was, that Arthur Young should have done something more than it did. 426 F. 
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use the standard suggested by the Commission during oral argu-
ment,19 which is described as follows: 
[W]hether the accountant performed his audit 
function in a manner that would have revealed to 
an ordinary prudent investor, who examined the 
accountant's audits or other financial statements, 
a reasonably accurate reflection of the financial 
risks such an investor presently bears or might 
bear in the future if he invested in the audited 
endeavor.2i) 
The Ninth Circuit found this statement too demanding. To 
accept such a standard, the court stated, would push an accoun-
tant toward guaranteeing the honesty of his client.21 The court 
recognized that this standard appealed to the Commission be-
cause it would enable them, with the help of accountants, to 
detect fraud earlier, stop the fraud, and then "bag the game."22 
However, the court concluded that attractive as the standard 
may seem to the Commission, the standard must be rejected 
since Congress never enacted a law to draft accountants into 
service as "[a]n enforcement arm of the SEC."23 
The court stated that a lower standard for determining liabil-
ity, proposed by Arthur Young, was sufficient under the circum-
stances of this case.24 This standard was good faith compliance 
with generally accepted auditing standards.25 The court found 
Supp. at 759. The trial court, relying on the expert testimony, found that either "more" 
was not required under GAAS or GAAP, or, at most as to one allegation, the expert 
testimony was evenly balanced that Arthur Young did all that was professionally required. 
[d. at 742. 
19. 590 F.2d at 788. 
20. [d. at 787·88. 
21. [d. at 788. Recently, the SEC has issued several releases in their efforts to gain 
tighter control over oil and gas programs, thereby suggesting to the court that had the 
Commission promulgated more explicit requirements earlier, this would have remedied 
many of the Commission's concerns in the present case. [d. at 788 n.3, discussing and 
citing Releases Nos. 33·6006, 33·6007, 33·6008, 43 Fed. Reg. 60404, 60413, 60418 (1978). 
22. [d. at 788. The court stated that presently, the Commission is hampered because 
it can only act after a securities violation; whereas if they were there earlier they could 
see the fraud and stop it. But, according to the Commission's viewpoint, since they cannot 
be there earlier and accountants are there, the accountants should take on the Commis· 
sion's role. 
23. [d. "The difficulty with this is that Congress has not enacted the conscription bill 
that the SEC seeks to have us fashion and fix as an interpretive gloss on existing securities 
laws." [d. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. The court concluded that the findings of fact demonstrated Arthur Young's 
good faith compliance with professional auditing standards. 
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support in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Republic 
National Life Insurance CO.28 In that case, the court noted that 
an accountant's only duty is to act honestly, with good faith, and 
use due care. If fraud is alleged, it must be "pleaded with particu-
larity. "27 .. 
The Ninth Circuit also found that United States v. Simon28 
was not applicable to the facts of this case. In Simon, the Second 
Circuit found an accountant liable under the securities laws, al-
though he complied with generally accepted accounting princi-
ples. This was based on a finding that the accountant consciously 
chose not to disclose facts that he knew were material on a finan-
cial statement. 29 The Ninth Circuit distinguished the present case 
from Simon since the facts of Arthur Young did not indicate 
deliberate concealment by the accountants. 30 
The court reasoned that denial of an injunction was proper, 
given that the lower court did not err when it refused to apply the 
Commission's standard and since the findings of fact were not 
clearly erroneous.3! Even if the trial court erred in concluding that 
the defendants did not negligently violate the securites laws, the 
appellate court stated that it would uphold the judge's exercise 
of discretion in deciding not to enjoin Arthur Young.32 This was 
based. on the fact that the lower court could still have found no 
reasonable likelihood of future violation, in which case an injunc-
tion would not have been an appropriate remedy. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
The Ninth Circuit, in Securities and Exchange Commission 
v. Arthur Young, makes it clear that the Commission's proposed 
standard for evaluating an accountant's performance under the 
federal securities laws was too high. The court's language empha-
sizes its disapproval of what it views as the Commission's attempt 
to use the court to enlist an auditor into service as an active 
26. 378 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
27. Id. at 440. 
28. 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970). 
29. Id. at 809. 
30. 590 F.2d at 789. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. The court was careful to point out that it made no finding that Arthur Young 
violated the securities laws. 
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enforcer of the securities laws,33 Yet the court did not clearly 
establish an alternative standard upon which accountants can 
rely, Instead, the court limited itself to stating that good faith 
compliance with generally accepted auditing standards was suffi-
cient in this case,34 
Accountants would prefer the courts to define the standard 
as good faith compliance with generally accepted auditing stan-
dards without qualification, and then to hold that compliance 
with this standard precludes liability,35 The Arthur Young court, 
by narrowing its finding to the circumstances of this case, in 
effect refused to set good faith compliance with a generally ac-
cepted auditing standard as the standard for accountants under 
the federal securities law,38 Other courts have also been reluctant 
to adopt such a standard,37 due in part to a fear that a profession 
allowed to set its own standards on which to base legal liability 
will inevitably be influenced by motives inconsistent with the 
securities law, enacted to protect the public interest,3S 
33. Id. at 788. "To accept the SEC's position would go far toward making the accoun-
tant both the insurer of his client's honesty and an enforcement arm of the SEC." Id. Also, 
the court states in reference to the Commission, "[ w ]hat it cannot do, the thought goes, 
the accountant can and shOuld." Id. The court then faults the Commission for trying to 
get the court to put an "interpretive gloss" on the securities laws. Id. 
34. Id. The court concluded that "under the circumstances of this case" the trial 
court "did not err as a matter of law" in the standard it chose to evaluate Arthur Young's 
conduct. Id. at 787. Yet the court never directly states what standard the trial court used, 
other than to say it was not the SEC standard. The Ninth Circuit simply looked at the 
facts of the case and concluded that Arthur Young's compliance with GAAS in good faith 
was sufficient to discharge its obligations. 
35. See Metzger & Heintz, Hochfelder's Progeny: Implications for the Auditor, 63 
MINN. L. REV. 79, 113 (1978). See also Earle, The Fairness Myth, 28 VAND. L. REV. 147 
(1975). 
36. 590 F.2d at 787. The court repeatedly uses limiting language such as "under the 
circumstances of this case," or, "[b]ecause the only sanction sought to be imposed on 
AY [Arthur Young] and its auditors was an injunction ... :" Id. 
37. See, e.g., Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwaith & Horwaith, 540 F.2d 27 
(2d Cir. 1976) (duty of accountants beyond complying with GAAP to report fairly to the 
public); United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 
(1970) (refusal of judge in a criminal trial to give jury instruction that the defendant will 
only be guilty for willful departure from GA·AP). 
38. Commentators have noted that the courts are not receptive to such a standard 
because it will be influenced by "the profession's natural tendency toward self-
protection." Metzger & Heintz, supra note 35, at 113. See also Briloff, We Often Paint 
Fakes, 28 VAND. L. REV. 165 (1975), in which the author criticizes accounting professional 
organizations for failure to adequately police and censure its own members. He perceives 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accounts who set professional standards as 
being preoccupied with "projecting the profession's image, thereby protecting its eco-
nomic interests .... " Id. at 195. 
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As a result, compliance with professional auditing standards 
is more of a threshhold test than an absolute guarantee of finding 
no liability. An accountant who fails to meet this threshhold test 
will most likely be held liable. 3D An accountant who does meet 
this threshhold test is, of course, in a better position, but may still 
be liable under the securities laws.40 
What more is required of accountants than compliance with 
professional standards is an issue not directly dealt with by the 
Arthur Young court. The court does stress that the Arthur Young 
firm acted in good faith when it complied with the auditing stan-
dards, yet the panel never defines good faith. 41 Perhaps an ac-
countant who lacked good faith but met professional standards 
would be liable in the Ninth Circuit. The Arthur Young court 
delineated one circumstance where even good faith compliance 
with professional auditing standards might be insufficient: when 
an accountant deliberately conceals a known material fact, or 
suspects fraud but looks the other way. 42 Other circumstances, 
where good faith compliance with professional auditing standards 
might not be enough, are not addressed by the Arthur Young 
court.43 The opinion only gives one a sense of the outer perimeters 
of what constitutes an acceptable or unacceptable standard for 
39. See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976); Escott v. 
Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
40. See United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 
1006 (1970) where compliance with GAAP did not insulate the defendant from criminal 
liability. 
41. 590 F.2d at 788. In the United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. 
denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970), the test involved in determining criminal liability of an 
accountant included "good faith." If the financial statement did not fairly present the 
financial position of the firm, "the basic issue became whether the defendants acted in 
good faith." [d. at 805. The court said compliance with professional standards was per-
suasive evidence, but not determinative of the good faith issue. Good faith was a jury 
question of whether an honest judgment had been made when the accountants failed to 
reveal on the financial statement known looting by a corporate officer. 
42. 590 F.2d at 789. 
43. One such circumstance might be when a particular standard is shown to be 
unreasonable. This parallels general negligence law, where following customary practices 
will not insulate the defendant from a finding of negligence if the custom is shown to be 
unreasonable. See Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147 (1942). 
Another circumstance considered by several courts is whether the financial statement 
fails to fairly present the financial position of the audited firm. See, e.g., Herzfeld v. 
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwaith & Horwaith, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970). See also Metzger 
& Heintz, supra note 35, at 113, where the authors state: "Liability will hinge, however, 
upon whether the statement 'fairly presents' the financial position of the audited firm, 
and not upon whether there is compliance with GAAP and GAAS." 
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accountants under the securities laws. How much more than good 
faith compliance with professional standards is necessary or how 
much less than showing present and future risks will suffice are 
questions that remain unanswered by the Arthur Young court. 
Arthur Young further indicates the Ninth Circuit's choice 
not to join the negligence - scienter debate. 44 Rather, it will 
assume negligence is the degree of culpability required in an in-
junctive action. Therefore, the plaintiff need not allege scienter 
as part of the prima facie case.45 However, if fraud is alleged, it 
will have to be alleged "with particularity."46 This requirement 
is based on fairness to the defendant:7 
The opinion reaffirms the Ninth Circuit's position as to when 
44. Since Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the question of whether a finding 
of scienter is necessary for an injunction under the securities laws has been a much 
debated issue. The circuits are split in their conclusions. In Securities & Exch. Comm'n 
v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976), the court held that negligence 
was sufficient for injunctive relief under §§ 17(a) and 10(b) and rule 10b.5. Id. at 540·41; 
see note 9 supra. The Second Circuit also appeared to use a negligence standard for a § 5 
(of the 1933 Act) violation, in Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Universal Major Indus. 
Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1047 (2d Cir. 1976), though in a later Second Circuit opinion, the 
court treated the issue as yet unresolved and found it unnecessary to decide the issue, 
Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Commonwealth Chern. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d 
Cir. 1978). In the Fourth Circuit, a district court found that scienter was necessary for 
injunctive relief under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 in Securities & Exch. Comm'n 
v. American Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148, 1171 (E.D. Va. 1977). Prior to Ernst, the 
Sixth Circuit required more than negligence for an injunction in Securities & Exch. 
Comm'n v. Coffrey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975). 
For a discussion of this issue and the position of different circuits, see Notes and 
Comments, SEC Enforcement Actions to Enjoin Violations of Section lO(b) and Rule lOb· 
5: The Scienter Question, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 831 (1977); Note, The Scienter Requirement 
in SEC Injunctive Enforcement of Section lO(b) after Ernst v. Hochfelder, 77 COLUM. L. 
REV. 419 (1977); Case Comments, Scienter and SEC Injunction Suits, 90 HARV. L. REV. 
1018 (1975); Comment, Injunctive Relief in SEC Civil Actions: The Scope of Judicial 
Discretion, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 328 (1974). 
45. The trial court indicated that had scienter been necessary, the action against 
Arthur Young would have been dismissed. 426 F. Supp. at 730. Since the action was 
brought under both §§ 10(b) and 17(a), see note 9 supra, it is not entirely clear whether 
scienter might be a necessary element if an injunctive action was brought under just one 
of those sections. However, it appears that the Ninth Circuit would probably assume 
negligence was sufficient if the action was brought under either § 10(b) or § 17(a), 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78j, 77q(a)(1978). 
46. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 378 F. Supp. 430, 440 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
47. In Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 68 F.R.D. 243 (1975), the court stated the 
"particularity requirement" is necessary to shield defendants from lightly made claims, 
especially when one's professional reputation can easily be damaged. Also, the court 
recognized that the defendant needs specific information to adequately prepare a defense. 
Id. at 245. 
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an injunction is an appropriate remedy under the federal securi-
ties laws. While a past violation continues to be probative, it is 
not the only criteria the court will examine; evidence of a reason-
able likelihood of future violation by the defendant is necessary 
for injunctive relief. 48 
C. CONCLUSION 
Arthur Young is part of a growing trend of accountants liti-
gating claims brought against them by the SEC, rather than 
simply entering into consent decrees. 49 The decision demonstrates 
that an action to enjoin accountants can be successfully defended 
in the courts. It further shows the heavy burden the Commission 
must overcome to reverse a lower court's denial of injunctive 
relief. 50 
Reassurring for accountants is the fact that the Ninth Circuit 
will not require compliance with a standard under which they 
must present risks to investors in the present and future. Exactly 
what is required of auditors for compliance with the federal secur-
48. The Ninth Circuit stated this position in SEC v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d 
692, 701 (9th Cir. 1978). The court concluded that the likelihood ofrepetition of the wrong 
was a critical factor and the district court was free to exercise its discretion and deny an 
injunction if the accountant negligently violated the securities laws. For a treatment of 
the Koracorp case, see Note, Standards for Summary Judgment and Injunctions in Secur-
ities Violations, 9 GOLDEN GATE V.L. REV. 287 (1979). This is consistent with the position 
taken by the Second Circuit in Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 
8 (2d Cir. 1977), where the court concluded that one instance of misconduct did not 
necessitate the issuance of an injunction when other factors indicated that the defendants 
"are not likely to need the prophylactic of an injunction to prevent recidivism." Id. at 19. 
It is important to examine the appropriateness of an injunction on a case by case 
basis, for it can have serious consequences. For a discussion of the effects an injunction 
might have on an accountant, see SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148, 1175-
76 (E.D. Va. 1977); Mathews, Program of the Committee on Fed. Reg. of Sec. SEC Civil 
Injunctive Actions, 30 Bus. LAW. 1305, 1307-09 (1975); Earle, Program of the Committee 
on Fed. Reg. of Sec. SEC Civil Injunctive Actions, 30 Bus. LAW. 1319, 1321-23 (1975). 
49. Wall St. J., July 16, 1979, at I, col. 6. The article points out that more firms are 
going to court for many reasons, amongst which are the protection of their professional 
reputations and the courts' increasing refusal to enjoin SEC targets. One commentator, 
recognizing the growing trend in SEC litigation describes Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Repub-
lic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) as "the first trial on the merits 
of an SEC injunction against a major accounting firm." Earle, supra note 48, at 1323 
(emphasis added). 
50. For a discussion of why the courts should not shift from the abuse of discretion 
standard when the SEC appeals from a denial of an injunction, see Comment, Injunctive 
Relief in SEC Civil Actions: The Scope of Judicial Discretion, 10 COLUM. J .L. & Soc. PROB. 
328, 367 (1974). 
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ities laws beyond the threshold test of good faith compliance with 
professional standards remains, however, less clearly defined. 51 
Susan J. Adler 
VI. A FINANCIAL COLUMNIST'S LIABILITY UNDER SEC 
RULE lOb-5 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Zweig v. Hearst Corporation, I the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that in certain circumstances, a financial columnist 
has a duty to disclose material information.2 The plaintiffs in 
Zweig alleged that the defendant intentionally used his position 
as a columnist to inflate the market for a particular stock in 
violation of rule lOb-5.3 The court concluded that this defendant's 
duty to disclose his intent to manipulate the market and reap a 
51. For suggestions of how an auditor can comply with the securities laws, see Metz-
ger & Heintz, supra note 35, at 116-18. For several viewpoints on this topic, see generally 
Symposium on Accountants and the Federal Securities Laws, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1975). 
1. 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. Apr., 1979) (per Goodwin, J.; Ely, J., dissenting; the other 
panel member was Solomon, D.J.) 
2. [d. at 1268. 
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978) (hereinafter rule lOb-5). Rule 10b-5 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the 
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or 
of the mails or of any facility of any national securities ex-
change, 
(a) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, 
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or 
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security. 
Rule 10b-5 was promulgated under 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1978) (hereinafter § lO(b», which 
provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the 
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or 
of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities ex-
change-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as 
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
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profit extended to anyone who would foreseeably rely on the 
market. 4 
The defendant wrote a favorable column about a small com-
pany, American Systems, Inc. (ASI), located in Southern Califor-
nia. On June 2, 1969, he purchased ASI stock at a discount5 from 
the corporation. His column was published on June 4, 1969 in the 
Los Angeles Herald Examiner. Furthermore, his column was re-
produced as a paid advertisement for ASI in a journal in which 
he had a financial interest. The price of ASI stock rose after 
publication of defendant's column. On June 5, 1969, the defen-
dant sold a portion of his ASI stock at a profit.6 The evidence 
showed that defendant had engaged in "strikingly similar" be-
havior in the past.7 
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant omitted the following 
facts from his column: (1) defendant invested in ASI stock at a 
discount before the column was published and intended to sell 
the stock after publication; (2) defendant' had a practice of 
"scalping" in the past; and (3) defendant's columns were often 
used as advertisements in his journal.s Plaintiffs never actually 
read defendant's column. Prior to publication of the column, 
Reading Guidance Center (RGC), a corporation in which plain-
tiffs each owned one third of the shares, entered into a reorganiza-
tion agreement with ASI. Under the agreement, ASI was to pay 
RGC shareholdersASI stock worth $1,800,000 on the market. The 
market value of the stock, according to their contract, was to be 
determined by the average closing bid for ASI stock from June 5, 
1969 to June 10, 1969.9 
4. 594 F.2d at 1269. 
5. [d. at 1264. The price defendant paid was two dollars per share; the bid price was 
3 %. The court did not decide the issue of whether this bargain price constituted receipt 
of consideration for defendant's column, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (1978). [d. at 
1264 n. 5. 
6. [d. at 1265. Defendant sold 2,000 shares at $5.00 each, thus making a $3.00 profit 
per share. 
7. [d. at 1264 n. 4. Defendant had bought stock, wrote a column, and then sold the 
stock for a profit within five days after publication of the column 21 times within a two 
year period. 
8. [d. at 1265. 
9. [d. This means that the higher the market price of ASI stock during this period, 
the fewer shares RGC shareholders (the plaintiffs) would receive as part of the reorganiza-
tion. Since defendant's column was published on June 4, it had great potential to effect 
the market price' of ASI stock during the critical period from June 5 to June 10, assuming 
readers were influenced by the column to purchase ASI stock. 
47
Willner et al.: Federal Practice
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980
270 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:223 
After an offer of proof by the plaintiffs, the district court 
concluded that the plaintiffs failed to show a right to relief and 
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. to The court stated 
that it found nothing wrong with a columnist's "making a nickel" 
after recommending a particular stock." 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit panel reversed and remanded,12 
characterizing the lower court's treatment of the defendant's 
motion to dismiss as a ruling on a motion for summary judg-
ment.t3 The appellate court determined that the defendant was 
not allowed to prevail as a matter of law, stating: 
We hold that these ... [federal security laws] 
also require a financial columnist, in recommend-
ing a security that he or she owns, to provide the 
public with all material information he or she has 
on that security, including his or her ownership, 
and any intent he or she may have (a) to score a 
quick profit on the recommendation, or (b) to 
allow or encourage the recommendation to be 
published as an advertisement in his or her own 
periodical.·· 
B. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The court dealt with each element of a cause of action under 
section lO(b) and rule lOb-5. It stressed the elements of material 
10. 407 F. Supp. 763. 764 (C.D. Cal. 1976). The court granted the motion to dismiss 
under FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b), which provides: 
After the plaintiff. in an action tried by the court without a 
jury. has completed presentation of his evidence. the defendant 
. . . may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the 
facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The 
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render 
judgment against the plaintiff . . . . 
11. 594 F.2d at 1271. 
12. [d. at 1263. 
13. [d. at 1264. Based on the transcript. the appellate court determined that the 
parties intended only to test the legal sufficiency of the piaintifrs claim. Therefore. the 
motion to dismiss functioned as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. 
P. 56. which provides: 
(c) The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings. depositions. answers to interrogatories. and admis. 
sions on file. together with the affidavits. if any. show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Therefore, in keeping with the standard of review on a motion for summary judgment, 
the court of appeal viewed the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. 
14. 594 F.2d at 1271. 
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omission and duty to disclose and gave lighter emphasis to the 
elements of scienter, reliance and causation. 
The court of appeals determined that defendant's failure to 
include in his column the facts of his stock ownership, his journal 
interest, and his intent to profit, were material omissions. Since 
these facts could have effected his objectivity, the court con-
cluded that they would be significant to a reasonable investor in 
evaluating defendant's investment advice and deciding whether 
or not to follow the column's recommendation to invest in ASI 
stock. 15 The court emphasized that stock ownership by a newspa-
per reporter might not be material in all situations. 16 It expressed 
why it was significant in this instance: "given the column's style 
and tone, with its glowing praise of ASI and conclusion that the 
firm was a worthy investment despite its risks, the effect of 
[defendant's] stock ownership on his objectivity would be im-
portant to his readers."17 
Defendant's Duty to Disclose I: To Readers 
The court found defendant's behavior analogous to that of a 
corporate insider who withholds material information while trad-
ing corporate stock. 18 Usually the information withheld by the 
insider relates directly to the company's value. The court recog-
nized that the information defendant withheld was of a different 
sort; it related to his motivations and objectivity in recommend-
ing purchase of ASI stock. Yet, the court reasoned, this difference 
in the type of information withheld is not determinative of the 
duty to disclose. IS Disclosure of both types of material informa-
tion is necessary, so that investors will not be misled in making 
their investment decisions. For this reason, the court concluded· 
that failure to disclose either type of material information while 
trading in the stock constituted a violation of section lO(b) and 
rule lOb-5.20 
15. Id. at 1266. 
16. Id. "[I]f [the column] objectively reported an undisputed fact or news event," 
stock ownership might not be material. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 1266. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 
F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
19. 594 F.2d at 1271. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1603, Revised Comment 3(d) (Mar. 
1978 Draft), which states that there is no reason to distinguish between the two types of 
material information. 
20. 594 F.2d at 1267. 
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The court rejected SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau21 
as controlling in this case. In Capital Gains, an investment advi-
sory service engaged in a scheme similar to that of the defendant 
in Zweig. The Supreme Court held that the SEC could get an 
injunction under the Investment Adviser's Act (the Act), compel-
ling the advisory service's disclosure to subscribers of its practice 
of profiting on its recommendations. 22 Since the Zweig plaintiffs 
did not show that defendant was an investment adviser, as de-
fined in the Act, the court concluded that the duties imposed on 
investment advisers under the Act did not pertain to the defen-
dant. 23 However, the court stated its belief that the rule (lO(b), 
lOb-5) and the Investment Advisers Act are complementary so 
that failure to bring the defendant within the latter was not fatal 
to the claim under rule lOb-5.24 
The court relied on Chasins v. Smith, Barney & CO.25 and 
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States28 in concluding 
that defendant had a duty to disclose to his readers under rule 
lOb-5. In Chasins, the broker-dealer defendant recommended se-
curities to his client, but failed to inform him of his market-
making activities in those securities. The Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals found the defendant liable under rule lOb-5 for failure 
to disclose this conflict of interest. 27 While Chasins could be read 
as applicable only in a broker-client context, the court in Zweig 
rejected this reading of the case.28 It read Chasins more broadly, 
21. 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
22. [d. at 180. The defendant in Capital Gains was liable under the 1940 Investment 
Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq. (1970). 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a) states: 
"Investment adviser" means any person who, for compensa-
tion, engages in the business of advising others, either directly 
or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities 
or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling 
securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular 
business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning 
securities; but does not include ... (D) the publisher of any 
bona fide newspaper, news magazine or business or financial 
publication of general and regular circulation .... 
23. 594 F.2d at 1267. The court specifically left open the question whether a columnist 
such as defendant could ever come within the Investment Advisers Act./d. at 1267 n.10. 
24. [d. For a discussion of the legislative history of each, see Peskind, Regulation of 
the Financial Press: A New Dimension to Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5, 14 ST. LOUIS U. 
L. J. 80, 84-88 (1969). 
25. 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970). 
26. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
27. 438 F.2d at 1167. 
28. 594 F.2d at 1268. 
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based on the Supreme Court's opinion in Ute. 29 
In Ute, the bank employee defendants acted as stock transfer 
agent for a corporation in which plaintiffs were former sharehold-
ers. Stock transfer agents usually have no duty to disclose.30 How-
ever, the Supreme Court held that the bank employees assumed 
this duty because they were active in encouraging a market for 
the corporation's stock and were in a position to profit from their 
sales.31 The Zweig court reasoned that the defendant's activities 
were so similar to the bank employees' activities in Ute, that he, 
too, assumed a duty to disclose under rule lOb-5.32 
The court found additional support for its conclusion that 
. the defendant had a duty to disclose to his readers his stock 
ownership, journal interest, and intent to profit, in White v. 
Abrams. 33 In White, the court stated five factors which it consid-
ered relevant to the scope of the duty to disclose under rule 10b-
5.34 Applying the factors to the defendant in Zweig, the court 
determined that although there was no fiduciary relationship, his 
duty extended to his readers because (1) defendant was in control 
of the material information and the only one with access to it; (2) 
defendant benefitted from his relationship with his readers, in 
that his employment depended on them; and (3) defendant's col-
umn initiated stock transactions by his readers and the resultant 
rise in the price of ASI stock.35 
29. [d., citing Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
30. 406 U.S. 128, 152 (1972). 
31. [d. at 153. 
32. 594 F.2d at 1268. "Here, as in Affiliated Ute Citizens, the defendant assumed 
those duties when, with knowledge of the stock's market and an intent to gain personally, 
he encouraged purchases of the securities in the market." [d. 
33. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974). 
34. The factors are: 
1. The relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff; 
2. Defendant's access to the information as compared to that 
of the plaintiff; 
3. Defendant's benefit derived from the relationship; 
4. Defendant's awareness of whether plaintiff was relying on 
their relationship in making his or her investment decision; and 
5. Defendant's activity in initiating the transaction in ques-
tion. 
[d. at 735-36. 
35. 594 F.2d at 1269. 
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Duty to Disclose II: To Nonreaders 
The court further analyzed defendant's duty to disclose to 
determine if it extended to RGC and its shareholders. If the duty 
did not extend this far, the shareholder plaintiffs could not re-
cover damages from the defendant. 36 The Zweig court concluded 
that defendant's duty to disclose did extend to the plaintiffs. 
Given that both the plaintiffs and readers were in similar posi-
tions, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs' relationship to the 
defendant was similar to the reader's relationship to himY The 
similarity of their positions arose from the fact that both the 
readers and the plaintiffs relied on an "honest" and "fully in-
formed market." Thus, "RGC and the readers had strikingly sim-
ilar stakes in the processes of the market. "38 
The court discussed RGC's expectation of an honest market 
when it entered in the reorganization contract with AS!. RGC 
relied on an honest market when it agreed to accept ASI stock 
worth $1,800,000, based on the average market price for ASI stock 
from June 5 to June 10. In an honest market, demand is generated 
by fully informed investors. However, investors were not fully 
informed by the column. Assuming investors relied on the col-
umn, causing the market to be distorted, the court concluded 
RGC was forced to deal in a "manipulated market" contrary to 
RGC's expectations when it entered into the reorganization 
agreement. 3D The court took this analysis one step further, con-
cluding that it was foreseeable to the defendant that RGC would 
rely on the market and be effected by any manipulations in that 
market. 40 
Other Elements: Scienter, Reliance, Causation 
Scienter was dealt with briefly by the court, which found 
that the defendant knew the facts he failed to disclose and, there-





40. [d. "If ... [the defendant] was unaware of RGC's reliance on the market, he 
could have discovered it with minimal effort by asking ASl or RGC about the terms of 
the merger, or by checking the reorganization agreement .... " [d. The court demon-
strated how the more successful the column was in influencing readers to buy ASl stock, 
the greater the discrepancy between what ASI stock was worth in a free market as opposed 
to its worth in a manipulated market. 
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dant's intent to benefit from his column!· 
The court dealt summarily with reliance and causation. It 
applied the Ute test of causation, which is satisfied by a showing 
of materiality in an action based on nondisclosure,42 Since the 
court previously determined that the omission was material, it 
concluded that. on remand, the lower court should presume AS! 
stock was purchased in reliance on the column,43 
Though plaintiffs never read the column, the court found this 
did not defeat liability under section lOb and rule lOb-5. The 
court reasoned that since RGC did rely on the natural processes 
of the market, and the market included defendant's reader who 
relied on full disclosure, this would suffice to establish liability,44 
The dissenting opinion, however, rejected this analysis. It rea-
soned that since the merger agreement took place months before 
publication of the column, there was clear evidence of non-
reliance.45 
Fairness and the Policy Behind the Federal Securities Laws 
The Zweig court expressed its belief that imposing liability, 
given the circumstances of this case, is within the "spirit" of the 
federal securities laws. 48 It stated that these laws aim to protect 
investors and the public from abuses effecting the market and 
foster the expectation that the market is free from manipula-
tion. 47 Therefore, the court concluded, to deny plaintiffs, who 
relied on an honest market, a cause of action under rule lOb-5 
would be contrary to the policy behind the federal security laws.48 
41. [d. at 1271. See also Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 607 F.2d 545, 555·56 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
42. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). The Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court erred 
when it held that the plaintiffs could not recover unless the evidence showed reliance. [d. 
at 152. "Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose, 
positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the 
facts withheld be material .... " [d. at 153. 
43. 594 F.2d at 1271. 
44. [d. at 1271. "We hold that these two legitimate expectations constitute sufficient 
reliance to establish liability in this case." [d. 
45. [d. at 1272 (Ely, J., dissenting). Circuit Judge Ely concluded that nonreliance by 
the plaintiff defeated any implication of reliance. Also, he viewed the fact that the agree· 
ment predated the column as fatal to the "in connection with" requirement of rule 10b·5. 
Therefore, he concluded the defendant was not liable. 
46. [d. at 1270. 
47. [d. at 1270 n. 16. 
48. [d. at 1270. See note 68 infra and accompanying text. 
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In addition, the court focused on the fairness of imposing 
liability when a financial columnist uses his position to manipu-
late the market and profit by it, stating: 
As we have illustrated, to extend the obligation of 
disclosure to the readers but to bar RGC from 
recovery under the rubrics of reliance or duty 
would lead to a wholly incongruous result: the 
more effective [defendant] was in elevating the 
price of the stock for his own benefit, the greater 
the losses an innocent third party [RGC] would 
have to absorb. 48 
C. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S REASONING 
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Zweig v. Hearst Corporation is 
noteworthy because it extends a duty to disclose material infor-
mation under section lO(b) and rule lOb-5 to a nontraditional 
defendant, a financial columnist. Though the defendant in Zweig 
had access to material information, he was clearly not an insi-
der.GO Nor was his information the result of a tip.51 Furthermore, 
the defendant was not in any sort of special relationship with the 
plaintiff. 52 In the absence of insider or tippee status, or a special 
49. [d. at 1270-71. 
50. See 2 A. BROMBERG, SEcuamES LAw: FRAUD SEC RULE 108-5 § 7.46(b) (1969). The 
author isolates "access" as the crucial criterion in determining who is an insider. "This 
means something more than possession ofthe information, but how much more is not yet 
clear. Probably it means possession intended to fit a corporate purpose (of the company 
to which the information relates)." [d. at ISO. Furthermore, 
Analytically, the obligation [of insiders] (to disclose) rests on 
two principle elements; first, the existence of a relationship 
giving access, directly or indirectly to information intended 
. . . for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of 
anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a 
party takes advantage of such information knowing it is una-
vailable to those with whom he is dealing. 
[d. at 179, citing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). 
In plaintiff's brief, the plaintiff referred to the defendant as an insider. Brief for 
Appellee at 66, Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979). However, the Court 
never accepted this characterization. C(. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1603, Revised Comment 
3(d) (Mar. 1978 Draft) (suggesting a new category of "quasi-insider," for one who has 
information that will affect the market, such as a financial columnist). 
51. A tippee is one who receives material inside information from an insider and acts 
on this information without disclosing it to the public. One who receives information as a 
result of a tip is under a duty to disclose or abstain from trading; this duty is based on 
the same rationale as the duty of an insider. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1974). 
52. See Peskind, supra note 24, at 90, where the author states: "[T]here is no 
judicial authority holding that the financial press owes a fiduciary duty to a potentially 
unlimited class of investors." 
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relationship between the parties, courts are often reluctant to 
extend an affirmative duty to disclose material information, 53 
perhaps for fear of the potentially limitless thrust of section lO(b) 
and rule lOb-5. 
However, the extension of an affirmative duty to disclose to 
a financial columnist seems reasonable owing to the special rela-
tionship to the market, and the ability to influence that market, 54 
created by that position. It is also a practical extension of the 
duty to disclose because a columnist's duty is only activated in 
certain limited situations, which reduces the prospect of endless 
liability under section lO(b) and rule lOb-5. 
According to the court, one will only assume this duty if he 
or she has knowledge of the market and an intention to gain 
personally. 55 An individual possessing these characteristics will 
then only be liable if he or she actively encourages purchase of 
stock on that market. 58 A further possible restriction on the poten-
tial class of plaintiffs that the defendant owes a duty to is that 
the plaintiff's conduct be reasonably foreseeableY 
Applying these factors to the defendant in Zweig, it seems 
fairly straightforward to conclude that he did owe a duty to dis-
close to readers of his column. It seems fair to hold the defendant 
liable to the plaintiffs, since they absorbed the damages he would 
have had to pay readers. But fairness alone is not enough; the 
53. For a discussion of an affirmative duty to disclose, see United States v. Chiarella, 
588 F.2d 1358, 1373 (2d Cir. 1978) (Meskill, J., dissenting). 
54. See SEC REPORT OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 70-78 (1963) where the SEC found that the potential impact of financial news on 
the securities market is great. See also Note, Stock Scalping by the Investment Advisor: 
Fraud or Legitimate Business Practice?, 51 CAL. L. REV. 232, 233-35 (1963) (emphasizing 
that if a particular stock has a thin market, even a small increase in demand may signifi-
cantly influence price). 
55. 594 F.2d at 1268. 
56.Id. 
57. Id. at 1269. From the Zweig decision, it is not clear whether "foreseeability" is 
an essential requirement. The Zweig court concluded that the plaintiffs were foreseeable, 
but this seems debatable. It might be a heavy burden to a columnist who writes several 
columns a week to investigate those columns. The Zweig court imposed this duty to 
investigate when it noted the defendant could have easily discovered the terms of the 
merger. Perhaps the court suspected that the defendant really did know the terms of the 
upcoming reorganization. However, it does seem fair to impose a duty to investigate when 
one with knowledge of the market manipulates it with the intent to gain. See In Re 
RepUblic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. and Reality Equities Corp., 387 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) 
(defendant who engaged in statistical reporting and expressed as his opinion a recommen-
dation of a security, had no duty to investigate the truth of what was published). 
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court must also find that the defendant owed a duty to the plain-
tiffs to establish liability under section lO(b) and rule lOb-5.58 
While the court applied the White flexible duty factors and 
concluded that the defendant owed a duty to his readers,59 it 
never applied the White factors in analyzing whether the defen-
dant owed a duty to the non-reader plaintiffs. If the White factors 
were applied, it is questionable whether the defendant owed a 
duty to the plaintiffs.so However, application of these factors 
makes more sense where a duty is owed to a special personal 
relationship, rather than in a "special relationship to the market" 
situation, as in Zweig. 
The court's application of Ute to the facts in Zweig forms a 
stronger basis for its conclusion that the defendant owed a duty 
to disclose to the plaintiffs. The defendants in each case were 
normally under no duty to disclose; yet each assumed this duty 
because of his conduct. However, the Zweig court took the Ute 
holding one step further: in Ute, the defendant bank employees 
'8ssumed affirmative obligations to disclose to parties they knew 
were relying on them as transfer agents;SI in contrast, in Zweig, 
there was no question of reliance on the defendant by the plain-
tiffs. 
The Zweig dissent correctly points out that it would have 
been impossible for reliance on the defendant's column to induce 
the plaintiffs behavior since the reorganization agreement was 
made in February, while the column was released in June.82 How-
ever, the timing of the manipulation and the plaintiffs purchase 
58. 594 F.2d at 1269. For other cases that discuss a duty to disclose, see Affiliated 
Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); United States v. Chiarella, 
588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 
F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970); 
Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969); Tucker v. Arthur 
Anderson & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
59. See note 34 supra. 
60. There was no relationship between the plaintiffs and defendant, the defendant 
derived no benefit from the relationship, the defendant could not have been aware that 
the plaintiffs would rely on the relationship (since it was impossible for them to rely), and 
the defendant did not initiate the transaction in question. This suggests a very weak duty, 
if a duty existed at all. 
61. 406 U.S. 128, 153-54. The Ute Court stated: "The mixed blood sellers 'considered 
these defendants to be familiar with the market for the shares of stock and relied upon 
them when they desired to sell their shares.' " [d. at 152. 
62. 594 F.2d at 1272 (Ely, J., dissenting). 
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or sale of securities does not seem to be as crucial as the dissent 
asserts, particularly in the Ninth Circuit.83 After Ute, it was gen-
erally agreed that proof of reliance is not necessary in an omis-
sions case; only the materiality of the omission is relevant.64 
There is some disagreement as to whether proof of nonreliance 
will defeat recovery. 85 Some cases have held a defendant liable to 
63. In Lewelling v. First Cal. Co., 564 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1977), the court stated: 
"[N]either 10(b) nor or Rule 10b-5 require[s] that the fraud occur before the transac-
tion. In accordance with this pronouncement, the trial court below ruled that there is no 
. 'mechanical test such as the clock or the calendar or the metronome' that governs the 
disposition." Id. at 1279 n.4, citing Lanning v. Serwold, 474 F.2d 716, 718-19 (9th Cir. 
1973) (emphasis in original). 
Because the merger agreement predated the defendant's column, the dissent in Zweig 
was concerned that the "in connection with" requirement of rule 10b-5 was not met. 
However, this requirement has been broadly interpreted. See, e.g., Superintendent ofIns. 
of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971) ("in connection with" requires 
that the plaintiff shall have suffered injury due to a deceptive practice "touching" its 
purchase or sale of securities as an investor); Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics 
Fund, Inc. 524 F.2d 275, 280 (2d Cir. 1975) (the "in connection with" requirement "may 
apply to a security different from the security whose sale originated the fraudulent 
scheme"); Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), (stating, in the 
context of a short form merger, that fraud on Class A shareholders was "in connection 
with" the forced sale by B). Contra, Raschio v. Sinclair, 486 F.2d 1029 (9th Cir. 1973) (the 
"in connection with" requirement was not met when the plaintiffs purchased stock prior 
to the misleading prospectus). However, Raschio differs from Zweig in that the purchases 
were actually consummated before the nondisclosure. 
64. See note 51 supra. For cases following Ute, see Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Competitive Associates, Inc. v. Laven-
thol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975); Titan Group Inc. v. 
Faggen, 513 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1975); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, 
Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Chasins v. Smith Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 
1970); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969); Tucker v. 
Arthur Anderson & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Wolfson v. Solomon, 54 F.R.D. 
584 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
65. In Crocker Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Control Metals Corp., 566 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 
1977), the court suggests that evidence of nonreliance may defeat the inference of reliance. 
"There was sufficient evidence that the bank did not rely on the alleged misrepresen-
tations, but instead made its own investigation, albeit inadequate, into the marketability 
of the stock." Id. at 636 n.3. 
However, in Zweig, the evidence ofnonreliance was somewhat different. Presumably, 
if the plaintiffs could have foreseen the future, they would not have relied on the market 
to set the exchange rate for ASI stock. The fact that they did not rely on the defendant's 
column specifically does not defeat causation, as the nonreliance in Crocker did. 
In Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976), 
the court stated two ways the defendant could disprove causation: "(I) by disproving 
materiality or by proving that despite materiality, an insufficient number of traders relied 
to inflate the price, and (2) by proving that an individual purchased despite knowledge 
of the falsity of a representation, or that he would have, had he known of it." Id. at 906. 
For a discussion of reliance, nonreliance, and rule 10b-5, See Note, The Reliance 
Requirement in Rule IOb-5 Class Actions, 7 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 373 (1976); Note, The 
Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule IOb-5, 88 HARv. L. REV. 584 
(1975); Note, Two Different Standards of Reliance Applied in Individual Private Damage 
Actions Under SEC Rule IOb-5 by the Second Circuit, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 183 (1975). 
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a third party when the defendant induces another party to act to 
the detriment of that third party. 88 Reliance may not be a realistic 
prerequisite for recovery in an open market context,61 The court's 
holding that the reliance requirement was met in Zweig is, there-
fore, not without support. 
Also, the Ninth Circuit's extension of this affirmative duty 
to disclose is logical in terms of the purposes behind the securities 
laws's and the courts' "flexible" interpretation of them to carry 
out these purposes. 'U Scalping is recognized as a m~nipulative 
device that can have a pronounced impact on the market.70 The 
66. In Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir.1969), the court 
concluded that plaintiff had a cause of action when an insider defendant created an 
extraordinary demand for the stock of a company so that shareholder chose not to tender 
to plaintiff, which operated to defeat the success of plaintiffs tender offer. Instead of 
reliance, "[wlhat must be shown is that there was deception which misled [otherl 
stockholders and that this was in fact the cause of plaintiffs claimed injury." [d. at 797, 
quoting Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Walsh 
v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 452 F. Supp. SO, 84 (E.D. Pa. 1978), where the court stated, 
"[wlhile we can find no authority directly discussing the issue of 'third-party reliance,' 
our understanding . . . reveals that reliance of this kind cannot be deemed insufficient 
as a matter of law." 
67. One commentator suggests that since a person can be harmed by a deception that 
effects the prices in the market without having heard the deception, reliance is irrelevant. 
3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 50, § 8.6. See also Tucker v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 67 F.R.D. 
468 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (the focus should be on causation, rather than on reliance); Wolfson 
v. Solomon, 54 F.R.D. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (market impact arising from nondisclosure, 
not reliance on the nondisclosure, causes the injury). 
68. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) in which the court states: "Rule 10b-5 is based in policy on 
the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on 
impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information ... " 401 F.2d 
at 848. For a discussion of Congressional intent to subject all investors to the same market 
risks and promote free and open markets, see United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341 (9th 
Cir. 1976), where the court states: "The bill seeks to give investors markets where prices 
may be established by the free and honest balancing of investment demand with invest-
ment supply." [d. at 347, quoting H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., at 10 (1934). 
69. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). The Su-
preme Court stated that Congress intended securities legislation designed to avoid fraud 
to be construed, "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial 
purposes." [d. at 195. See also, Peskind, supra note 24, at 88, where the author notes that 
"[ c ]ourts have emphasized that Rule 10b-5 is intended to be a flexible, general provision 
to cover all species of fraud." 
70. "Scalping involves the purchase of securities by a person in a position to influence 
others by his recommendation or favorable commentary on that security, the recommen-
dation of that security to investors, and the sale of that security after capital apprecia-
tion." Peskind, supra note 24, at 81. Scalping was categorized as a manipulative device 
in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). The success of 
scalping depends on whether the advice given will be followed and if this will significantly 
effect the market. For a discussion of the economic impact of scalping, see Note, supra 
note 54, at 233-35. See also SEC REPORT OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 
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remedy to prevent abuse is full disclosure.71 This remedy would 
work in the present context since it would effectively stop a finan-
cial columnist from using his or her position to manipulate the 
market for a quick profit because the columnist would have to 
disclose an intention to do just that.72 Furthermore, "With judi-
cial approval of ... [defendant's] operation, the integrity and 
reliability of the financial press would be destroyed."73 Financial 
columnists engaging in manipulative conduct should beware of 
conflicts of interest which must be disclosed, for the Ninth Cir-
cuit will extend rule lOb-5 to encompass them. 
D. CONCLUSION 
After Zweig v. Hearst Corporation, it is clear that the Ninth 
Circuit will extend an affirmative duty to disclose under section 
lO(b) and rule lOb-5 to a defendant who is not an insider, tippee, 
or in a special relationship with the plaintiff. The fact that a 
financial columnist, such as the defendant in Zweig, may not 
come within the Investment Advisors Act will not insulate the 
columnist from liability under the federal securities law. Rather, 
the columnist who intends to engage in stock scalping or who 
writes from a perspective other than disinterested objectivity, 
must disclose his or her position to readers, or suffer potential 
liability under section lOb and rule lOb-5. 
SusanJ. Adler 
88th Congo 1st Sess. 70·78 (1963), which discusses the impact even a single newspaper 
column or magazine article may have on the market. 
71. See 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 50, § 7.4(b). See also Fleischer, Mundheim, & 
Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 
U. PA. L. REV. 798, 831 (1973). 
72. See Fleischer, Mundheim, & Murphy, supra note 71, at 827, where the authors 
state: "Although disclosure is the regulatory technique applied by the cases, it would 
normally be so embarrassing or impractical to make the required disclosures that, as a 
practical r;natter, in most instances scalping and sneaking to the head of the line can be 
viewed as prohibited." 
73. Appellant's Brief at 68, Zweig V. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979). See 
also SEC REPORT OF THE SECURmES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 70· 
78 (1963), which states that some publications such as Time Magazine and the Wall Street 
Journal, have policies against writing about a company in which the author owns stock. 
This suggests a similar concern for the integrity of the press. 
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VII. IMPROPER REMOVAL: CALIFORNIA v. C & H SUGAR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1975, a large multidistrict antitrust case was filed in the 
Northern District of California. Designated as In re Sugar Indus-
try Antitrust Litigation, I it involved several hundred plaintiffs, 
scores of attorneys and fourteen defendants in approximately one 
hundred consolidated cases.2 The State of California filed one 
case, alleging violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.3 The 
state sought to represent a consumer class of indirect purchasers 
composed of its citizens and residents. Shortly after the district 
1. 395 F. Supp. 1271 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975). 
2. On December 19, 1974, the government instituted two criminal actions and three 
injunction lawsuits against several refiners of sugar, charging them with violations of 
section one of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1979). In the first criminal indictment, 
United States v. Great Western Sugar Co. Crim. No. CR 74 830 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 1974), 
cited in In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation, 1977-1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 61,373, 
at 71,325, the government alleged that defendants unlawfully combined and conspired to 
fix the price of refined sugar in the Chicago-West Territory. The second criminal indict-
ment and companion civil suit United States v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Co., No. 
CR 74 2675, id., made similar allegations regarding the California-Arizona Territory. 
Thereafter, private parties filed civil antitrust lawsuits in four district courts in Cali-
fornia, Illinois, Washington and Minnesota. On June 2, 1975, the Judicial Panel on Multi-
district Litigation transferred the pending cases to the Northern District of California 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976) for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. 
For a discussion of the complex multi-district litigation procedures, see note 16 infra. 
The complaints alleged that the defendants conspired and combined to: (1) establish 
and raise the basic prices for molasses and refined sugar, (2) establish prepaid freight 
applications, (3) eliminate, reduce and restrain the providing of allowances to customers 
for molasses and refined sugar, (4) establish, raise, maintain and stabilize the effective 
selling prices for molasses and refined sugar, (5) refuse to sell or to limit the sale of private 
label sugar, (6) threaten to employ price discrimination and sales below cost to force 
agreement on the non-utilization of private label sugar a,ld on establishing, raising, main-
taining and stabilizing the effective selling prices for molasses and refined sugar, (7) 
discourage customers from entering into any commitments for the purchase of private 
label sugar, (8) use the monopoly power enjoyed by various of the defendants and their 
co-conspirators in certain markets to finance and support the previously described prac-
tices, and (9) maintain prior agreed upon market shares within the various markets for 
molasses and refined sugar sales. 
As a result of the allegations, every separate sugar product, every method of market-
ing refined sugar and molasses and every level and method of distribution was before the 
court. 1977-1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 61,373. 
3. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1979), provides in pertinent part: "Every 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be ille-
gal. ... " [d. § 1. 
The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-17 (1973), provides in pertinent part: "Any person 
whO shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the 
antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shaH recover three fold the damages by him 
sustained . . . ." [d. § 15. 
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court denied class certification,4 California v. California & 
Hawaiian Sugar Company (C & H Sugar)5 commenced in state 
court, alleging violation of state antitrust law. The case was re-
moved by the sugar companies to federal district court to be 
consolidated in the multi-district litigation in process.8 California 
moved for an order to remand the case to state court alleging lack 
of removal jurisdiction. The district court denied the petition for 
remand.1 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that federal law does not 
pre-empt state law and therefore indirect purchasers could file 
consumer class claims against sugar refiners under California 
antitrust law in state court.8 By filing a state claim, such purchas-
ers avoid the problems posed by the United States Supreme 
Court's controversial Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois9 decision which 
held that under federal law indirect purchasers could not re-
4. For a discussion of the issue of class certification in this litigation see the district 
court's opinion in In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation, 1977-1 TRADE REG. REp. 
(CCH) ~ 61, 373 at 71, 327. 
5. 588 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. Nov., 1978) (per Merrill, J.; the other panel members were 
Sneed and Lindberg, JJ.) (as modified on denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc). 
6. Id. at 1271. On removal jurisdiction, one commentator states, "The right to remove 
an action, properly brought by a plaintiff in one set of courts, into another court system 
for trial has no roots in common law." 7B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 89-3, at JC-660 
(2d ed. 1979). "If there is to be a removal of action because it is one 'arising under the 
. . . laws of the United States' the federal claim must be substantial and normally appear 
in the complaint well pleaded and without anticipation of defenses." Id. § 1441, at JC-
701. 
7. In re Sugar Antitrust Litigation, 1976-2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 61,004. It should 
be noted that an order granting remand is not appealable except in very limited circum-
stances inapplicable here. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (d) (1973). That factor seemed to weigh 
heavily on the district court when it issued the above order certifying the interlocutory 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Id. at 69,443. 
8. 588 F.2d at 1274. The consumer claims alleged violations of The California Car-
twright Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 et seq. (West 1964) relating directly to 
restraints on competition. The statutory definition of trust is located at CAL. Bus. & PROF. 
Code § 16720 (West 1964). For the allegations of the complaint which parallel § 16720, 
see note 2 supra. 
Under § 16750, consumers have standing to sue: 
(a) Any person who is injured in his business or property by 
reason of anything forbidden or declared unlawful by this chap-
ter, may sue therefor in court having jurisdiction in the county 
where the defendant resides or is found, or any agent resides or 
is found, or where service may be obtained, without respect to 
the amount in controversy, and to recover three times the dam-
ages sustained by him, and shall be awarded a reasonable attor-
ney's fee together with the costs of the suit. 
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750 (West 1979). 
9. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
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cover.10 The court of appeals noted that the action did not arise 
under federal law and therefore the case should have been re-
manded to state court for construction under California law." 
B. BACKGROUND 
In 1922, the Supreme Court in Lambert Run Coal Co. v. 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad12 developed the rule of derivative ac-
tion. The rule states that if a state court lacks jurisdiction over 
the subject matter of an action, that defect cannot be cured by 
removal. 13 Thus, a removed action must be dismissed by the fed-
eral court if it has acquired no jurisdiction from the state court. 
While this rule was developed nearly six decades ago, it was not 
until 1972 that it was expanded by the Ninth Circuit to include 
the complex field of anti-trust litigation. 
In State of Washington v. American League of Professional 
Baseball Clubs (Baseball),14 the Ninth Circuit first concluded 
that under the Lambert Run doctrine it was without jurisdiction 
to proceed on the federal anti:trust claims commenced in state 
court and second, remanded the case for disposition of the re-
maining state claims.15 Although Baseball was an extension into 
the complex field of anti-trust litigation, neither Baseball nor 
Lambert Run was a case involving the intricacy of multidistrict 
litigation. 16 
10. 1d. at 729. 
11. 588 F.2d at 1274. 
12. 258 U.S. 377 (1922). 
13. "The jurisdiction of the federal court on removal is, in a limited sense, a deriva· 
tive jurisdiction. If the state court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties, 
the federal court acquires none, although it might in a like suit originally brought there 
have had jurisdiction." Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 258 U.S. at 
382. 
This rule has been vigorously criticized: 
With some logic, but indefensible from the standpoint of pract-
ical judicial administration, the principle of derivative jurisdic-
tion, as it pertains to subject matter jurisdiction of the sate 
court, has been applied so that any action commenced in state 
court, involving a matter over which the federal courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction, is subject to dismissal, after removal, for 
want of jurisdiction even though the federal court would have 
jurisdiction of a similar case brought originally therein. 
1A J. MOORE, supra note 6, ~ 157[3jat 46-47; 1976-2 TRADE REG. REP. ~ 61,004, at 69,444. 
For a critical discussion attacking this rule, see H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1200 (2d ed. 1973). 
14. 460 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1972). 
15. 1d. at 660. 
16. The statutory provisions on multi-district litigation are found at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 
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The multidistrict litigation laws vested the district courts 
with broad authority. Developed at a time when federal courts 
were faced with "massive calendars and mandated speed-up pro-
visions,"17 the multidistrict litigation vehicle allows preparation 
and trial of multiple cases that are substantially identical or 
closely similar, filed in various district courts. This procedure was 
designed to avoid most of the duplicative and often contradictory 
practices encouraged by separate cases proceeding in several 
courts at the same time. IS This type of litigation seems to have 
principally arisen in antitrust cases. IS The Ninth Circuit first ex-
tended the Lambert Run doctrine only to antitrust cases in 
Baseball, but now extends it to multidistrict litigation as well. 
Thus C & H Sugar20 is significant since it revives a sixty year old 
rule in the context of the most complex area of litigation. 
Not only was the C & H Sugar panel faced with the issue of 
derivative jurisdiction, but it was also presented with the prob-
lems created by Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois. 21 This case has seri-
ous implications for the fair and effective enforcement of federal 
antitrust laws. 22 The majority in Illinois held that "the over-
charged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain ofmanufac-
ture or distribution, is the party 'injured in his business or prop-
erty' within the meaning of Section [4 of the Clayton Act]."23 
Thus in federal antitrust cases, with rare exceptions, only persons 
who have dealt directly with an antitrust violator can recover 
damages for injuries suffered as a result of a violation. 
and foil. § 1407 (1976). For discussions of multi-district litigation procedures see Levy, 
Complex Multi-district Litigation and the Federal Courts, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 41 (1971); 
Grossman, Class Actions: Manageability and the Fluid Recovery Doctrine, 47 L.A.B. Bull. 
415 (1972); 1 B. GARFINKEL, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 1979 at 521-53 
(1978). 
17. 1976-1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 61,004, at 69,445. See generally Peterson and 
McDermott, Multidistrict Litigation: New Forms of Judicial Administration, 56 A. B. A. 
J. 737 (1970); Neal and Golbert, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel Judi-
cial Administration, 50 A.B.A.J. 621 (1964). 
18. This argument was the basis of the district court's opinion when the motion for 
remand was denied. 1976-2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 61,004, at 69,444-46. 
19. B. GARFINKEL, supra note 16, at 521. 
20. 588 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1978). 
21. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
22. For a discussion of Illinois Brick, see Note, Recovery by Indirect Purchasers and 
the Functions of Antitrust Treble Damages, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1445 (1977); S. REP. No. 96-
239, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in TRADE REG. REP., No. 393 (July 16, 1979), 
concerning the 1979 Antitrust Enforcement Act, the purpose of which is to legislate away 
the Illinois Brick decision. 
23. 431 U.S. at 729. For the text of § 4 of the Clayton Act, see note 3 supra. 
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C. STATE ANTITRUST CLAIM 
The C & H Sugar complaint filed in state court charged that 
the sugar companies engaged in a conspiracy to restrain trade by 
the fixing and raising of the price of refined sugar and prepaid 
freight applications in violation of California's Cartwright Act.24 
Plaintiffs also sought to represent a class of retail purchasers of 
sugar, but once the case had been removed, the district court 
denied their motion for class certification.25 
The plaintiffs moved for remand contending that removal 
jurisdiction did not exist since the cause of action was based 
purely on state law. They argued that the facts demonstrating an 
antitrust violation arose under state, not federal, law and, there-
fore, there was no basis for removal jurisdiction. The defendant 
sugar companies argued that the facts alleged in both federal and 
state actions were identical and should be heard together.26 Dis-
trict Judge Boldt found that plaintiffs' attempt to seek relief in 
state court was an improper attempt to circumvent the district 
court's denial of consumer class certification.27 The Ninth Circuit 
rejected these findings, holding that the claims were asserted 
under California's antitrust laws on facts that did not state a 
federal claim.28 
Under Illinois Brick, a consumer class composed of indirect 
purchasers cannot claim injury under section four of the Clayton 
Act.2t Thus, the court observed that if the consumer class action 
claims of the plaintiffs were construed under federal law, the 
holding in Illinois Brick would require that the action be dis-
missed in federal court. While the process of removal of state 
actions "looks forward to trial of the removed cause in a more 
appropriate forum,"30 in this situation, removal would assure that 
the cause would never be tried at all. The court found it illogical 
to construe the state law claims as arising under federal law, 
when, under the federal law of Illinois Brick. indirect purchasers 
24. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16,660 et seq. (West 1964). See note 2 supra. 
25. 588 F.2d at 1272-73. 
26. 588 F.2d at 1272. 
27. 1976-2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 61,004, at 69,445; 588 F.2d at 1272. 
28. 1d. at 1274. 
29. 431 U.S. at 729. 
30. 588 F.2d at 1273. 
"The right of removal being statutory, a suit commenced in a state court must remain 
there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of Congress." Great Northern 
Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 280 (1918). 
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have no standing to assert their claims. On the other hand, under 
California law indirect purchasers may have standing.31 
Since the freedom to settle these issues is best left to the 
state, to deny remand under the circumstances of this case would 
actually amount to federal pre-emption of the state antitrust laws 
by judicial act. 32 The state would have no power other than to 
legislate consistent with the Clayton Act as it was construed in 
Illinois Brick. 
The Ninth Circuit further rejected the sugar companies' ar-
gument that remand would pose grave problems of management 
in the litigation.33 They argued that removal of the case was in 
the nature of a bill of peace34 designed to simply join all claims 
in one forum based upon the same cause of action. The court 
dismissed that argument by finding that state and federal courts 
would not be adjudicating identical claims because the plaintiffs, 
as indirect purchasers, had no federal claims whatsoever. There-
fore, it was proper for California to bring the action in state court 
where it might receive proper recognition. 
D. CRITIQUE 
While the Ninth Circuit seemed to place considerable em-
phasis on the Illinois Brick decision, it is important to note that 
case had not been decided until after the appeal in C & H Sugar 
was filed. 35 It would appear that other factors weighed heavily in 
the court's decision to remand the case to state court. One of the 
factors was the dicta established in a prior Ninth Circuit case, In 
re Western Liquid Asphalt,38 which held that there should be no 
bar to recovery to those who could demonstrate that they "bore 
the burden of the violation."37 In Western, the court held that 
31. 588 F.2d at 1274. 
32.Id. 
33. Defendants cited Lee's Prescription Shops, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer Co., Inc., (1970) 
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 73,180 (S.D.N .Y. 1970), IN WHICH THE COURT REFUSED TO REMAND 
STATING THAT TO DO SO WOULD BE BURDENSOME AND WASTEFUL. 
34. The object of a bill of peace is to suppress useless litigation, to prevent multiplic-
ity of suits, to restrain oppressive litigation, and to prevent irreparable mischief. 2 J. 
STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 853 (1866). 
35. Illinois Brick was decided on June 9, 1977. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). However, the 
appeal for C & H Sugar was filed shortly after the July 23, 1976 denial of remand. 588 
F.2d at 1271 n.3. 
36. 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973). 
37. The court stated: 
The antitrust laws are to be construed so as to achieve the 
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indirect consumers have standing to sue based on the theory that 
unlawful prices charged to their contractors were actually passed 
on to the consumer.38 The court's desire to be consistent with 
Western presented a problem for the court. By circumventing the 
problem posed by Illinois Brick, the court extended the question-
able Lambert Run doctrine to include the field of multidistrict 
litigation.3D 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit greatly expanded and brought into 
the modern era a sixty year old rule which held that a federal case 
must be dismissed when removed from a state court that origin-
ally did not have proper jurisdiction. This problem was first 
evidenced in Baseball, where the Lambert Run rule was recog-
nized to effect antitrust actions. Now in C & H Sugar, the Ninth 
Circuit again used the derivative jurisdiction doctrine to defeat 
unified federal control over an antitrust action to give the state 
courts a means to protect its citizens by application of state 
rather than federal law. 
In view of the intent of multidistrict litigation to bring simi-
lar cases involving the same parties together in one forum, the 
C & H Sugar decision may have created additional problems. By 
permitting the remand of the state case, the court has justified 
the fragmenting of vast numbers of cases that would normally 
have been joined in a multidistrict suit. 
Michael J. Walker 
V. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
In Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 
Oct., 1978), the court upheld a dismissal for lack of personal ju-
broad goals which Congress intended to effectuate. One such 
policy goal is that there be no hiatus in the enforcement of these 
laws. Each individual who is injured may sue. Thus, while we 
should not impose multiple liability upon defendants, nor give 
recovery to uninjured plaintiffs, neither should we bar recovery 
to those who can demonstrate that they bore the burden of the 
violation. 
Id. at 200. (emphasis added), But cf., Sherman, Antitrust Standing: From Loeb to 
Malamud, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 375 (1976) (sampling of cases where different results have 
been obtained). 
38. 487 F.2d at 200. 
39. This problem was articulated by District Judge Boldt in his order denying re-
mand. 1976-2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 61,004, at 66,996. 
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risdiction in a libel suit. The California church sued a Missouri 
publisher claiming jurisdiction in California on the basis of the 
publisher's revenues from California advertisers. The court held 
that because the advertising revenue was unrelated to the pre-
sent action, that that revenue was not the basis for sufficient 
contact with California. The panel also held that because the 
Missouri publisher could not have foreseen that any substantial 
risk of defamation would arise from its circulation of apprQxi-
mately 150 articles in California, that California distribution was 
held to be insufficient contact with California. 
In Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. Nov., 1978), 
the Shell Oil Company brought an action against the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) and its administrator as part of 
an attack on the decision of the California Regional Water Qual-
ity Control Board to grant a class E permit for one of Shell's 
refineries. Shell was dissatisfied with the classification and con-
sequently applied for a variance which was reviewed and denied 
by the Regional EPA office. Shell alleged in its complaint that 
the granting of the Class E permit and the denial of its applica-
tion for the variance from that classification were decisions made 
by the Administrator of the EPA and not by the Regional Board 
which was the ostensible decision-making body. Shell's com-
plaint, which was filed in district court, was dismissed for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals held that al-
leged EPA coercion did not transform actions of the state agency 
into federal agency action reviewable by a federal court. Judge 
Wallace filed a dissenting opinion and would have found juris-
diction in federal court to review an informal and indirect EPA 
action. 
In International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. 
Kleppe, 592 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. Jan., 1979), a religious society 
and one of its members brought suit alleging violation of their 
constitutional rights under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3),(4). 
Their petition for preliminary and final injunction relief was de-
nied by the district court. The court of appeals held that even if 
the constitutional case or controversy requirement was satisfied, 
the cause of the religious society and its members, who sought 
freedom to districute literature and solicit contributions in a 
national park was not ripe for adjudication. It was not ripe 
because they had not applied for nor had been denied a permit 
under the challenged regulations and have never been prosecuted 
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for violation of such regulations. Additionally, new adopted 
regulations which were specifically designed to deal with their 
type of activities, cast doubt about the currency and signifi-
cance of their challenge. 
In Jerlian Watch Co. v. Department of Commerce, 597 F.2d 
687 (9th Cir. May, 1979), the Jerlian Watch manufacturer sued 
the Secretaries of Interior and Commerce to challenge the valid-
ity of the 1979 allocation rules with respect to importation of 
duty-free watches. The court held that allocation rules were sub-
stantially related to traditional customs purposes and, thus, ju-
risdiction of a challenge to the rules was exclusively vested in the 
customs courts. Furthermore, plaintiffs had the adequate rem-
edy in the customs court of importing more than a duty·free 
quota allocation, paying duties assessed, and then suing for re-
fund. The plaintiffs had this remedy despite their contention 
that it was financially impossible for them to do so. 
In H. Ray Baker, Inc. v. Associated Banking Corp., 592 F.2d 
550 (9th Cir. Mar., 1979), the court held that although a Philip· 
pine corporation had banking relationships in California it was 
unfair to require it to defend suit on an irrevocable letter of 
credit in California. The court examined the contacts that the 
Philippine corporation had and determined that the contacts 
were not sufficient for jurisdiction. The Philippine corporation 
had selected a New York bank and as a consequence the corpo-
ration could not have reasonably expected the issuance or negoti-
ation of a letter of credit to have had effect in California. 
In Sierra Club v. Hathaway, 574 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. Aug., 
1978), the Sierra Club, a non-profit environmental organization 
requested a preliminary injunction to prevent the Secretary of 
the Interior from executing lease agreements that would give pri-
vate parties the right to explore for and commercially produce 
geothermal steam and associated resources in a known geother-
mal resource area. In denying the injunction, the court held that 
the casual use step of the exploration phase would not involve 
activities that would substantially affect the environment. Be-
cause the district court considered the testimony of nine experts 
in relevant fields, the district court's finding that the casual use 
permitted by the initial step of the exploration phase of the geo-
thermal leasing program would not significantly affect the envi-
ronment was not clearly erroneous. 
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In Anrig v. Ringsby United, 585 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. Nov., 
1978), plaintiffs brought an action against corporate and individ-
ual defendants to recover for breach of lease agreements and vio-
lations of the Clayton Act and the Securities Act. Subject matter 
jurisdiction was based on a federal question and diversity. The 
court held that the word "defendants", as used in 28 U.S.C. § 
1391 (b) and (c) refers to indispensable defendants. Therefore, if 
a nonresident, non indispensable party is listed as a defendant, 
that status will not automatically require dismissal of the entire 
suit for lack of venue. Rather, all non indispensable parties 
should be dismissed to preserve proper venue for the indispensa-
ble parties. 
In Church of Scientology v. United States, 591 F.2d 535 (9th 
Cir. Feb., 1979), the Church of Scientology petitioned for return 
of property seized and for the suppression of that evidence. The 
Ninth Circuit dismissed an appeal from the order denying those 
motions on the ground that such pre-indictment motions are 
mere steps in a criminal case. Because the judgment was inter-
locutory, it was not appealable. 
In Monti v. Department of Industrial Relations, 582 F.2d 
1226 (9th Cir. Sept., 1978), the plaintiff brought a civil rights 
class action suit charging the California Department of Indus-
trial Relations with systematically engaging in a pattern of em-
ployment discrimination against female employees. The plain-
tiffs' motion for an order to be certified as a class action was 
denied by the district court. The plaintiffs appealed and further 
requested that the Ninth Circuit issue a writ of mandamus to 
compel the district court to certify the class. The court held that 
a denial of a motion for class certification is not immediately 
appealable under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(a)(1) and a writ of 
mandamus would be singularly inappropriate for appeal in this 
case because it would emasculate attempts to preserve the integ-
rity of the congressional policy against piecemeal appeals. 
In Citizens Utilities Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph 
Co., 595 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. Apr., 1979), the court held that with 
respect to an antitrust action which had been pending for sixteen 
years and had not yet been tried, the district court's finding of 
prejudice due to plaintiff's lack of diligence was supported by the 
record. Therefore, the court found no abuse of discretion in dis-
missal for want of prosecution. 
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In Lee v. Blumenthal, 588 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. Jan., 1979), 
plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of 
the Treasury to redeem certain flower bonds. Since the court of 
claims has exclusive jurisdiction over contract actions against 
the United States where the amount in controversy exceeds 
$10,000.00 and has authority to render a money judgment 
founded upon any regulation of an executive department, the 
Ninth Circuit held that whether the action-was characterized as 
one in contract or one to interpret regulations, the court of 
claims would be the proper forum. 
In Her Majesty Queen in Right v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 
(9th Cir. Mar., 1979), the Canadian Province of British Colum-
bia sued to recover on a judgment for taxes which had been 
awarded against defendants by a British Columbia Court. The 
Ninth Circuit examined the British Columbia claim in light of 
the revenue rule and reciprocity requirement and held that the 
courts of the United States could not enforce a judgment ren- <;, 
dered for taxes by the courts of a foreign government. 
In Smith v. Lujan, 588 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. Jan., 1979), a 
lessee brought an action against the lessor's heirs for reexecution 
of a lost lease. The court held that the trial court did not err in 
holding that a suit in equity for a reexecution of a lost lease was 
not a "claim, or demand against the estate" for purposes of con-
forming to Guam's "dead man" statute which was identical to 
California's statute. Additionally, the court held that the doc-
trine of res judicata did not preclude the lessee's action since a 
prior order had determined only that the court had been without 
jurisdiction to order the administrator to execute the lease and, 
consequently, it did not dispose of issues presented in a subse-
quent action as to whether or not the lease was executed on a 
certain date, and if so, its terms and whether the executed copies 
were lost. 
In Burke v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 592 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 
Feb., 1979), labor union trustees brought suit for contributions 
incident to employment. The issue raised by the appeal was 
whether the district court had jurisdiction over a dispute con-
cerning payments owed by the defendant to union trusts as a 
result of work completed by defendant's employee. The court 
held that because defendant's third-party complaint sought re-
covery of payments made for the same work that formed the ba-
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sis for the engineers trustees' complaint in the event the engi-
neers' trustees were successful, the federal district court had 
ancillary jurisdiction of the employer's claim over and against 
the trustees of the carpenter's fund. Additionally, with regard to 
the denial of the carpenters' trust's motion for summary judg-
ment, the court held that the denial of summary judgment may 
not be reviewable on the theory that dismissal for lack of juris-
diction constitutes a final judgment in which denial of summary 
judgment merges, allowing review on appeal. 
In People of the Territory of Guam v. Landgraf, 594 F .2d 
201 (9th Cir. Mar., 1979), the defendant appealed from an order 
of the district court of Guam denying petition to remove his 
criminal prosecution pending in the superior court of Guam to a 
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1443(1). The court of 
appeals held that it could not read the statute's reference to an 
action in "state" court as including an action in the courts of the 
Territory of Guam because when Congress has intended to ex-
tend section 1443(1) to an entity other than one of the fifty 
states, it has done so expressly. 
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